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The 95th Rifles were part of the British Army's answer to tactical problems posed 
by the Napoleonic Wars, in particular how to deal effectively with the massed 
skirmishers employed by the French. The bulk of this work examines the process by 
which the 95th was established: its background, formation, organization, discipline and 
doctrine. The final chapter documents how the 95th was used on the battlefield during the 
Peninsular War, focusing on the campaign to defend Portugal in 1810-1811. The study is 
based upon both primary and secondary sources relating to napoleonic warfare and the 
British Army. This includes manuals, diaries, memoirs, dispatches and original clothing 
and equipment. 
This research demonstrates that the 95th greatly increased the British Army's 
ability to face the French Army on equitable footing. The regiment proved a model of 
reform for the rest of the army, pioneering disciplinary and tactical changes throughout 
the nineteenth century. 
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"Hurrah for the first in the field and the last out of it, 
the bloody fighting ninety-fifth." 
Peninsular toast quoted by 
Captain John Kincaid 
Introduction 
A great deal of scholarly work has been produced on the Napoleonic Wars, 
ranging from studies of the economics and societies of participating nations to the far 
more common works on diplomatic and military topics. For the student of military 
history there is still much to be learned about the Napoleonic era, which saw the birth of 
what has become known as modem warfare. Napoleon's campaigns changed the face of 
war as it was recognized in the eighteenth century, returning to the style of warfare 
waged by the Romans at the height of their strength by seeking the decisive battle. 
Warfare in the eighteenth century had been characterized by its limited nature, small 
armies of professional soldiers that were expensive to maintain and took years of 
intensive training, fighting campaigns with narrowly defined goals. Campaigns were 
little more than long marches and sieges of key fortified positions, attempting to preserve 
the armies involved and force a negotiated settlement after exhausting the enemy. 
Avoiding defeat and the loss of the army was seen as more of a virtue than wining 
decisive victories at the expense of heavy casualties. By harnessing the material and 
ideological energies released by the French Revolution, and a seemingly endless supply 
of conscripts produced by the levee en masse, Napoleon could seek decisive battle by 
maneuvering his enemy into a position that forced him to stand and fight. His goal then 
was not to force the enemy to negotiate, but to destroy completely his ability and will to 
fight. Those nations that survived the Napoleonic Wars did so by adapting to Napoleon's 
style of warfare or, as the British did, by choosing to fight only on their own terms. 1 
1David G. Chandler, ed., and Ian Beckett, assoc. ed., The Oxford History of the British Army (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 139-140. 
I 
2 
What all but a few of these studies have lacked is an acknowledgment of the vital 
importance of small unit tactics in the winning of battles, and therefore of campaigns. 
Most have emphasized Grand Tactics, the art of maneuvering divisions and corps, 
ignoring the fact that at the point of decision it is the actions of battalions and sometimes 
even of companies that decide the day. It is the training and courage of individual 
officers and men that determine if a line breaks or holds under fire or in the face of 
charging cavalry. Every army during the Wars of the French Revolution and of 
Napoleon had its share of units that influenced the course of the campaigns in which they 
fought: Kellerman's Dragoons at Marango, the Russian Cossacks in the winter campaign 
of 1812-1813, Maitland's Guards Brigade at Waterloo. The British Army produced one 
such unit that was to stand out, a regiment whose employment at the tactical level would 
substantially alter the course of Britain's war with France. This regiment, the 95th, was 
the inheritor of a trust passed down from the middle of the eighteenth century by a few 
visionaries within the conservative British Army. 
The 95th was a breed apart from the rest of the British Army at the time. Rather 
than wearing the scarlet coat of the line infantryman and fighting with the smoothbore 
musket, the soldiers of the 95th wore bottle green coats and carried rifles. These riflemen 
were not trained to fight shoulder to shoulder in the two deep line, but to fight in pairs in 
the loose skirmish chain. They were the product of a new discipline and of the re-
learning of the tactics of the light infantryman in an army that had long neglected that 
style of warfare. The 95th was over fifty years in the making, the result of much hard 
learned experience in both peace and war. The new discipline and tactics were perfected 
by Colonel Coote Manningham and Lieutenant Colonel the Honorable William Stewart 
3 
with the creation of the Experimental Rifle Corps in 1800 and by Major General Sir John 
Moore at the Shomcliffe training camp from 1803 to 1805. They would prove that 
properly applied tactics could and did win campaigns. They got their chance in the 
Peninsular campaigns of Sir Arthur Wellesley and Sir John Moore, 1808-1814, where 
Britain chose to fight on the periphery of Europe on her own terms with a small 
professional army. 
The first chapter of this study of the 95th examines the long struggle through the 
eighteenth century to create an adequately trained and equipped corps of riflemen in the 
British Army, culminating in the creation of the Experimental Rifle Corps in 1800. 
Experiences in North America, the West Indies and Europe that bear relevance will be 
examined along with those individuals whose experience or works influenced the 
creation of the 95th . The second chapter investigates the organization and new discipline 
of the Experimental Rifle Corps, its drafting into the line as the 95th, Sir John Moore's 
camp at Shomcliffe and his system of training. Chapter three examines the doctrine of 
the riflemen, how they were to be employed as protection for the army on the move, 
while in camp and in battle. The final chapter covers the actual experience of the 95th in 
the Peninsular, examining the defense of Portugal from the close of the Talavera 
campaign of 1809 to the opening of the Fuentes de Onoro campaign of 1811. Close 
attention is paid to operations along the Coa in the spring and summer of 1810. Here 
the 95th operated along with the rest of the Light Division as outposts for the entire 
British Army, never once allowing the French to break through their line, or passing on 
inaccurate information to Sir Arthur Wellesley. It is therefore a study of the tactics of a 
single regiment and its influence on the course of a series of campaigns. 
Chapter 1 
Creating a Corps of Riflemen: The Long Struggle of the Eighteenth Century 
The need for a corps of riflemen in the British Army, indeed of any kind of 
professional light infantry, did not become apparent until the American Wars of 1748-
1763. Prior to the experience of warfare in the wilds of North America the linear tactics 
employed by European armies in the Wars of Spanish and Austrian Succession had 
indicated there was little need for light infantry. What little use they could serve was best 
filled by detachments of irregulars hired for the duration of the conflict and disbanded 
following peace. It was expensive enough fielding and maintaining even the smallest 
army of regular heavy infantry let alone including the added expense of light infantry. 1 
The rigid linear tactics practiced at the time had developed from the growing 
reliance on massed and rapid volleys of musketry from densely packed infantry and on 
the sheer shock and weight of the fire impacting upon the opposing line to disorder and 
demoralize the enemy. The ultimate expression of this was in the army of Frederick the 
Great of Prussia. His army consisted of soldiers drilled and flogged until they could load 
and fire like automatons. An increasing number of cannons added their weight to the 
firefight and cavalry was employed to finish of the broken and demoralized enemy. 
A new type of light cavalry, the Hussar, descendant of the Huns of old, was 
employed by the Prussian and Austrian armies, first as irregulars and later as regular 
units, to perform the old light infantry duties of scouting. The ponderous lines and march 
1 J. F. C. Fuller, British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1925), 76. 
Irregular troops, from the fringe of Europe, were commonly more trouble then they were worth. Their 
practice of rape and pillage offended Enlightenment sensibilities of hmnane and scientific warfare. 
4 
columns of the opposing armies of the day were so unwieldy to form up for battle that it 
took all of the talent of commanders simply to get their heavy infantry into position to 
fight. There was no place it seemed for larking about with skirmishing. The army that 
could march and deploy the fastest determined the site of battle. The formations 
employed could only hope to maneuver on the most open of terrain anyway and the 
carefully drilled automaton-like soldiers would be put through their paces until the best 
drilled and least individualistic side triumphed. 2 
5 
The nature of warfare in the Americas, away from the rolling, open fields of 
northern Europe, caused a few perceptive officers within the British Army to realize that 
reform was necessary. Unfortunately they were few in number and it took time and 
several disasters for their warnings to be heeded. Colonial America was the perfect 
environment for the light infantryman; in fact the rigid, heavy formations used in Europe 
were hopelessly inadequate for employment in the rugged, heavily wooded terrain of 
North America. The dense lines of infantry and cavalry could hardly form up, let alone 
advance or charge. The colonists, both British and French, who had settled the land, 
understood how to use the terrain to their advantage as did their native allies and enemies 
whom they emulated. The regular military commander who understood how to make 
use of the terrain and the skills of the locals would achieve victory in any war in North 
America. Unfortunately for the British regulars, their commanders did not understand 
quickly enough. 
These skills to modem eyes seem simple to grasp. The use of cover and 
concealment, aimed fire, demoralization of the enemy by killing his leadership, and 
"Ibid .• Chapters Ill and IV, 41-75. 
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breaking up his formations before fading away, are the tactics of the dozens of bush wars 
around the world seen nightly on the news. They are tactics taught to and practiced by 
soldiers in places like Vietnam and Beirut. To the officer of the mid-eighteenth century 
who was not accustomed to this style of warfare, this was madness, the tactics of savages 
and cowards. To the conservative mind, battles were fought between disciplined 
professionals and won by the correct application of shock, either massed volleys of 
musketry or the cold steel of the bayonet charge. What the French had succeeded in 
accomplishing, and what the British would seek to emulate, was a blend of irregular, 
back-woods tactics with the discipline of the trained regular. The first British lesson 
would be learned in 1755 at the Battle of Monongahela. In this engagement in the woods 
of western Pennsylvania, a French and Indian army numbering 901 officers and men, 
mostly Canadian colonists and Indians, overcame a force of 1495 British regulars and 
American provincials under General Edward Braddock. The British, adhering to the 
rules of war as dictated by Frederick the Great, and fighting in an exposed line, were 
massacred by French and Indian sharpshooters firing from cover. Only the American 
provincials, dispersing into the woods, fought the French and Indians on equal terms. 
The result was telling, as the British lost 977 officers and other ranks, the French and 
Indians only 39. Braddock was not a bad officer. By the standards of Europe he had a 
great deal of experience and was actually a very good commander. He was simply 
applying inappropriate tactics. 3 The British not only had to study and understand their 
enemy's tactics; they had to devise a way to overcome them. 
31. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, vol. 2 (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1910. Reprint, 
New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1976), 285-286. 
7 
The first professional corps of British light infantry was established on Christmas 
Day, 1755, in the form of the 60th Regiment ofFoot, the Royal Americans. 4 The Colonel 
commanding the regiment was British, Lord William Howe, who became famous during 
the French and Indian War as a leader of British light infantry in the Americas, but many 
of the other officers were German or Swiss, as were most of the enlisted men. While a 
number of American irregular formations were raised, it was the 60th that was the most 
important as it was a regular army formation. The 60th was formed with the intention of 
creating a body of soldiers with the ability of "combining the qualities of the scout with 
the discipline of the trained soldier." 5 The regiment consisted of four battalions, each of 
ten companies 6 commanded by German officers and recruited primarily in Pennsylvania 
amidst the English, Swiss, German and Austrian colonists. 7 
A Swiss officer, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Bouquet, commander of the 60th 's first 
battalion, had the most influence on the development of the regiment's light infantry 
doctrine. He had seen service in Europe with and against armies trained in the system of 
Frederick the Great and understood its inherent weakness of relying on brutality to 
discipline the soldiers. He realized that intelligence and self motivating discipline must 
replace mindless drill and flogging and that a breed of soldier capable of beating 
untrained irregulars or professional soldiers in any style of warfare was necessary. 
Bouquet studied Indian warfare "not to copy it - this would have indeed shown 
his incapacity to overcome it - but to discover its nature so that he might devise a system 
4Fuller, British Light Infantry, 87. 
51bid., 98. 
6This is a huge regiment for the time. Most regiments in the British Anny had a single battalion, a small 
number had two. 
7Fuller, British Light Infantry, 98. 
of tactics whereby he could destroy it. "8 Bouquet then instituted a new method of 
training his soldiers, doing away with the pipeclay and ridiculous accoutrements so 
popular with the system of Frederick. His soldiers dressed as the colonists did in 
practical lightweight clothing and trained to fight in the wilderness in small, loose 
formations as the Indians did. They were also taught valuable skills to look after 
themselves and each other: carpentry, shoe making and repair, farming and masonry, 
among others. 9 
Bouquet recorded many of his experiences and theories in An Historical Account of 
the E'<pedition against the Ohio Indians, in the Year MDCCLXIV., under the Command 
of Hemy Bouquet, Esqre in which he stated quite clearly the importance of light infantry 
as part of the regular army: 
... if they were beat two or three times, (meaning the Indians) they 
would lose that confidence inspired by success .... But this cannot 
reasonably be expected till we have troops trained to fight them in their 
own way, with the additional advantage of European courage and 
discipline. 
Any deviation from our established military system would be needless, 
if valour, zeal, order and good conduct were sufficient to subdue this 
lightfooted enemy. These qualities are conspicuous in our troops; but they 
are too heavy, and indeed too valuable, to be employed alone in a 
destructive service for which they were never intended. They require the 
assistance of lighter corps, whose dress, arms and exercises, should be 
adapted to this new kind ofwar. 10 
With the 60th and the various irregular units recruited in the colonies the British 
were able to defeat French expansion in North America and with the Peace of Paris in 
8lbid., 102. 
9S ir Arthur Bryant, Jackets of Green: A Study of the History, Philosophy and Character of the Rifle 
Brigade (London: Collins, 1973), 21-40. Throughout the first chapter of his work Bryant mentions a 
number of times the importance of the riflemen being self reliant and able to perform any number of skills 
that soldiers in regular line regiments, away from the commissariat, were unable to do. 
10 Quoted in Fuller, British Light Infantry, 106-107. 
8 
9 
1763 to end French involvement in North America. The tactics of Frederick, however, 
had won the war in Europe. Thousands of soldiers, drilled endlessly and flogged into 
obedience, had marched in long lines across rolling plains as heavy infantry had for ages, 
battering each other to pieces under the shock of rapid yet unaimed musketry and bayonet 
charges. The leadership of the British Army at Horse Guards, the administrative heart of 
the army in London, viewed that as the only way civilized nations could wage war; 
events in the colonies had been an aberration and best forgotten. The lessons learned by 
the 60th in America and by Austrian and French light infantry commanders in Europe, 
especially by Marshal de Saxe, that the accurate fire of light infantry could destroy any 
line or column and remain relatively unscathed, were swept out of sight and the irregular 
formations were disbanded. In the cutbacks that followed the war even the light 
companies of the line regiments that had been created to provide skirmishers for the 
heavy infantry, and had been successfully brigaded together as Light Battalions during 
the war, were disbanded. 11 Still, the spark of the new discipline and doctrine was kept 
alive in the British Army by the likes of Howe and others. 
The French were greatly influenced by Frederick's tactics, for it was they, with 
their Austrian and Russian allies who had received the worst end of them. Unlike the 
British Army they also remembered the lessons learned in America. A French officer, M. 
le Comte Turpin, a student oflight infantry tactics, produced a work in 1754 which was 
studied by Bouquet and others and influenced those in the British Army who saw the 
need for light infantry. His work, entitled Essai sur I 'Art de la Guerre, advocated a 
system of discipline based more on common sense than the whip and called for a greater 
11Fortcscuc, A History of the British Army, vol. 2., 598-599. 
closeness between light infantry officers and their men. Turpin believed, "It is very 
requisite for an officer oflight troops to obtain a thorough individual knowledge of the 
men under his command, that he may employ them according to their intelligence and 
courage." 12 Another Frenchman, M. Guibert, also noted the importance of regular as 
opposed to irregular light infantry and argued they should be trained to fight as infantry 
of the line, that is as heavy infantry, as well as in extended order. The ranks oflight 
infantry formations should be filled with "chosen veterans." 13 He also proposed the 
implementation of realistic training in peacetime, an uncommon practice in European 
armies at the time. "In peace," Guibert noted, their officers "should teach them those 
exercises which are found serviceable in war." 14 
10 
The war for independence that erupted in America caught the British Army once 
again ill-prepared for war in the colonies. The light companies of the line regiments had 
been re-established in 1770 but amounted to little more than a place to dump soldiers that 
did not fit the image of pipeclay and hairpowder established by the Prussian system. 
Finally, in 1774, as conditions in America worsened, General Howe received orders from 
Horse Guards, possibly at the direction of George III, 15 to recreate Britain's light infantry. 
He was given only seven companies with which to work. 16 This proved timely as Britain 
slipped into war with the American Colonies the following year. 
1
~Quoted in Fuller, British light Infantry, 116. A similar view came to be held by Col. Coote 
Manningham and Lt. Col. William Stewart when they formed the Experimental Rifle Corps, as will be seen 
with their Company System of organization. 
13 Ibid .• 122. France at this time was busy raising a nmnber of light corps known as the Chasseurs a 
pied. 
14Jbid. This is a novel concept in the eighteenth century as most officers had little or no professional 
interest in their anny careers beyond social events and advancement. 
15No source indicates precisely where tl1e order originated. 
16Fuller, British light Infantry, 125. 
11 
The low to which British light infantry had sunk in the interwar years was 
immediately evident at Concord and the retreat through Lexington to Boston. The forces 
that took part in that battle were all flank companies, the light and grenadier companies of 
several regiments, supposedly the elite of the regiment. Yet, when faced with militia 
employing light infantry tactics, the British officers and men failed to respond as they 
lacked adequate training. Had proper light tactics been employed by the British at 
Lexington the Americans likely would have been quickly swept aside as they lacked the 
discipline to hold together as a cohesive unit in the face of an adversary employing 
similar tactics against them. 17 
Over the course of the war the British had once again to learn the lessons of good 
light infantry work. Again they employed irregular forces raised from amongst the 
loyalists to face the American backwoodsmen in the vicious fighting along the frontier 
and in the south, John Simcoe's "Queen's Rangers" and Banastre Tarleton's Legion 
being the most famous. A Major Patrick Ferguson raised a corps of British sharpshooters 
armed with a breech-loading rifle of his own invention. They fought one engagement 
with the weapon, killing seventeen Americans as compared with the loss of only two 
British riflemen who could load and fire while in a prone position. 18 Despite this 
achievement, Sir William Howe ordered Ferguson, to discontinue the use of his rifle 
which was withdrawn from service. British tactics employed by regular officers 
continued to prove unable to cope with situations encountered in America. The massive 
17Fortescue, A History of the British Army. vol. 3, 152-154. Experience in the French and Indian War 
had shown that irregular troops usually refused to stand in the face of a determined rush with bayonets. 
18Fuller, British Light Infantry, 129-131. This is the first recorded use of rifles by British troops. It is 
hard to understand why they were withdrawn from service as t11ey obviously out classed the American and 
Hessian Jaeger rifles then in service which were long and clumsy to load, impossible to load while prone. 
12 
loss of British soldiers at Bunker Hill, especially officers, was a direct result of flawed 
tactics. While the British line advanced to carry the position it was not screened by light 
infantry in skirmish order 19 and suffered several bloody repulses as the American line had 
not been disrupted or demoralized by British skirmishers. 
The British did make one critical advance in their doctrine during the American 
War oflndependence, although it was not made official until Wellington's Peninsular 
Campaign: namely, the adoption of the two-rank line. This formation, a departure from 
the Prussian three-rank line, allowed an increase in firepower by a third as every musket 
could be brought to bear, and as it was looser and more flexible, it allowed faster 
deployment and movement. Still, throughout the war the British were unable to keep 
pace with the number of light infantry the Americans could deploy against them, and in 
the long run this was a contributing factor in their defeat as they could not effectively 
carry the war to the Americans. Even so, the British light infantry that did exist was 
equal to the Americans. Indeed at Guildford Courthouse in 1781 the British light infantry 
and Hessian Jaegers proved superior to the American irregulars in the skirmishing that 
took place. 20 
Other than the acceptance of looser, two deep lines that increased firepower and 
mobility while decreasing casualties, British officers who served in America were 
beginning to understand that accurate firepower - not the unaimed broadsides of 
Frederick - was the best replacement for the shock of the bayonet charge. The old school 
19lbid., 126-127. Fuller docs note that the Light Infantry under Howe at Bunker Hill were so unprepared 
for proper light infantry work that they could not have been deployed properly as such anyway. 
"°Ibid., 129. 
traditionalists who had not served in America believed this tantamount to heresy. 21 
Those officers who understood the evolving battlefield instructed their men to properly 
level their muskets rather than simply to load and fire as quickly as possible without 
aiming, as was the practice in other European armies. 
13 
The Hessian Jaeger officer Captain Johann Ewald discussed the most valuable 
lessons of the war for the developing light infantry doctrine in the British Army. The 
Jaegers, or "hunters," he commanded were among the best light infantry the British had 
in their service and Ewald' s A Treatise Upon The Duties Of Light Troops was influential 
in solidifying a new light infantry doctrine. While Ewald was well aware of the 
defensive capabilities oflight infantry, as piquets and outposts, it was on their role in the 
offense that his work displays the most interest. He was able to show that light infantry 
properly employed could prove a devastating weapon for the able commander. By 
making use of cover and concealment and mutually supporting fire, parties of riflemen or 
light infantrymen advancing in rushes could move quickly to seize key terrain features 
and disable enemy forces by killing officers and NCOs and other key personnel like 
artillery crews. The offensive nature of his theory is clearly displayed in the following: 
"For it is a general rule in war that he who begins the attack has already half the victory, 
and fortune generally favours the resolute and brave, and very often, indeed, the rash." 22 
The British were to find that the tactics they had learned in the war against the 
Americans worked with deadly precision against other armies clinging to the Prussian 
21The bayonet remained something of a British quirk into the twentieth century. Accounts of a "British" 
cheer followed by a short rush with the bayonet come up again and again. These were not charges over a 
long distance but short controlled rushes to push the enemy back supported by the second line holding in 
place and alternated with controlled volleys of musketry. 
22Quoted in Fuller, 147. 
14 
system. In 1778 when British troops fought French army at St. Lucia in the West Indies, 
British light infantry under General Medows engaged a French column while deployed in 
skirmish order. They drove off the French, inflicting 400 deaths and wounding an 
additional 1200 men, versus only 13 killed and 158 wounded, including General 
Medows. 23 The postwar cutbacks that followed the peace of 1783 were even deeper than 
those following the French and Indian War. For the next ten years the British Army 
declined precipitously. Again the lessons paid for in blood during the war were discarded 
in peace. The French, as before, remembered the lessons and would put them to use 
during the wars of the French Revolution. The Experimental Rifle Corps and ultimately 
the 95th Rifles would be created out of this period of confusion and decline by the actions 
and work of six individuals who paid heed to the lessons of the past and suffered in the 
new classroom of battle against revolutionary France. 
The first of these men was General Sir David Dundas. Dundas, who was in no 
way a proponent of light infantry, realized that the British Army was in sorry shape and 
in serious need of some kind of reform and reorganization. Reorganization, at least, was 
accomplished under Dundas's auspices with the publication of his The Principles of 
Milita,y Movements in 1788 and Rules and Regulations in 1792. These two works gave 
the British Army a new standardized drill book for the first time since 1758. While his 
drills were essentially only simplified, faster, looser variations on the Prussian system and 
did not yet officially recognize the two deep line, they ensured the whole army was 
unified in a system of drill. In Part III of his Rules and Regulations there were brief 
23Fortcscuc, A History of the British Army, vol. 3, 268-271. 
15 
comments on the role of light infantry. Although scant, they were of great importance to 
the advocates of a corps of regular light infantry in that for the first time light infantry 
was dealt with in the Army's official drill manual. 24 
The second of these figures was Major General John Money. In the late 1790s he 
proposed a series of reforms based on his experiences in the American War of 
Independence and observations of the early battles of the French Revolutionary Wars. 
Money was greatly impressed by the organization and skills of the French tirailleurs, 
raised from the mass of conscripts and volunteers following the outbreak of war between 
France and Austria. He felt that if the British Army were ever to face the French it would 
be in serious trouble without the establishment of a corps of light infantrymen equal if not 
better in skill then the French. He believed that the British light infantry should be 
modeled on the Native Americans and the American irregulars he had observed in action. 
Money argued, "I have seen Indians fire and am persuaded that fifty of them could kill or 
take two hundred men of any high-dressed regiment in Europe who had fifty miles to 
march in a woody or extremely inclosed country .... "25 He also noted that these new 
light infantrymen should not be clothed in the traditional scarlet of the British Army as "a 
sentry becomes, in a scarlet coat, a complete target to riflemen .. .if they are clothed in 
green, or dark brown, they are not discernable, but at a very short distance." 26 Other 
reforms envisioned by Money involved creating balanced combined arms formations of 
24Fullcr, British Light Infantry, 197. 
25 Ibid., 209. Also Chandler and Beckett, Oxford History of the British Army, 149-150. The enclosure 
and urbanization of northern Europe in the last decades of the eighteenth century had done much to alter 
the face of the countryside making the Prussian style of warfare based on long lines impractical. Europe 
was now much more suited to the columns and swarms ofvoltiguers and tirailleurs employed by the 
French Revolutionary and later Imperial Armies. 
26Fullcr, British Light Infantry, 210. 
light infantry, light cavalry, and horse artillery with several officers trained in combat 
engmeermg. 
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The Duke of York, Frederick Augustus, second son of George III, also played an 
important role in Army reform. Having served against the French in Flanders in 1793 
and the Helder campaign of 1799, he was aware of the need to counter the French light 
infantry. His backing and interest allowed the creation of the Experimental Rifle Corps 
in 1800, its drafting into the line in 1803 as the 95th and the conversion of the 52nd 
Regiment of Foot to light infantry in 1803 at the Shorncliffe camp under Sir John Moore. 
The fourth important figure came from among the officers of the 60th Royal 
Americans, when in 1798 the 5th Battalion of the 60th was raised to fight exclusively as 
light infantry and were armed with rifles. The commander of this Battalion of mostly 
Germans was Colonel Francis de Rottenburg, an experienced Austrian leader of light 
infantry. His Regulations for the Exercise of Riflemen in the Field, published in 1798, 
became one of the standard texts of the British light infantry and in particular of the 
Experimental Rifle Corps and the 95th. He served with Sir John Moore in Ireland in 1798 
and his battalion served with distinction in the Peninsular War as individual companies 
attached to other Brigades. The 5th Battalion, 60th Royal Americans was the first corps of 
true light infantrymen to serve in the British Army, trained and equipped from the 
moment of formation as skirmishers and to carry out all the tasks associated with light 
infantrymen. 27 
The final two figures of note are Colonel Coote Manningham and Lieutenant 
Colonel the Honorable William Stewart. In the spring of 1800, following the disastrous 
27lbid., 215-221. 
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Helder campaign of the previous year, they were selected to assemble and command an 
experimental corps of riflemen. This new corps was to receive training as sharpshooters 
and light infantrymen to counter the French tirailleurs and to cover the movements of the 
British Army in the field. 28 The corps assembled at Horsham barracks, volunteers and 
drafts from fifteen regiments of the regular army. They were clothed in green jackets and 
pantaloons, black belts and equipment and armed with the Baker Rifle. They trained that 
summer in Windsor Forest and three companies covered the landing and withdrawal of a 
British Expeditionary Force at Ferrel on the northwest coast of Spain on 25 August, 
1800. This date is regarded as the official birthdate of the 95th. While recovering from 
wounds received at Ferro), Lieutenant Colonel Stewart prepared detailed Standing Orders 
for the new unit, which would become the guide for the 95th, Regulations for the Rifle 
Corps formed at Blatchinton Barracks under the Command of Colonel Manningham. 29 
These two officers would lead the Experimental Rifle Corps through its early battles and 
would participate in the creation of the 95th and the development of a new model of 
discipline and training with Sir John Moore at the Shorncliffe Camp in 1803. 
18B ryant, Jackets of Green, 22. 
19lbid., 22-23. 
Chapter 2 
The Forging of a Sword: Recruiting, Organization, and a New Discipline 
In January of 1800, the Duke of York as Commander in Chief of the Army 
ordered the creation of an Experimental Corps of Riflemen as part of a series of ongoing 
reforms following the rather poor showing of the British Army on the continent against 
the armies of Revolutionary France. A letter was circulated from Horse Guards, the 
administrative headquarters of the army, at the order of the Duke of York and signed by 
Harry Calvert, the Adjutant General, on 17 January 1800, to the Colonels of fourteen 
regiments then stationed in England and Ireland stating that, 
... it is His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chiefs intention to form 
a corps of detachments from the different regiments of the line for the 
purpose of its being instructed in the use of the rifle and in the system of 
exercise adopted by soldiers so armed. It is His Royal Highness's 
pleasure that you shall select from the regiment under your command, 2 
sergeants, 2 corporals and 30 private men for this duty, all of them being 
such men as appear most capable of receiving the above instructions, and 
the most competent to the performance of the duty ofRiflemen. 1 
In addition each regiment was to provide several officers and musicians for the 
Experimental Corps and it was noted that both officers and men were to be considered 
only on temporary detachment, not drafted out of their regiments. This indicates that 
initially at least the Experimental Rifle Corps was not intended to be a permanent 
organization but something similar to the eighteenth century practice of brigading Light 
and Grenadier companies of several regiments together to provide an elite formation for 
the duration of a campaign. 
1 Colonel Willoughby Verner, History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, vol. 1 (London: J. Bale and 
Sons & Daniclsson, 1912. Reprint. London: Buckland and Brown, 1995), 19. 
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The fourteen regiments of the line provided 443 officers and men for the 
Experimental Rifle Corps, which was intended to have a strength of 844. The remaining 
men were provided from drafts recruited from the Irish Fencibles, a militia organization, 
each man receiving a bounty of ten guineas. 2 Many of the Colonels of these line 
regiments took the creation of the Rifle Corps as an opportunity to get rid of men they 
considered unfit for duty and sent their worst privates, NCOs and officers. 3 Other 
regiments such as the 92nd Highlanders (later the famous Gordon Highlanders) ordered 
that: 
The detachment of riflemen will march tomorrow under the command 
of Ensign Cameron. The Major expects that the detachment will conduct 
itself in such a manner as to do credit to the Regiment they belong to and 
Ensign Cameron will so exert himself on the march, and after he has 
arrived at Horsham, that his detachment will appear as respectable in the 
corps they are to join, as the regiment has always done among other 
Regiments. 4 
Throughout the spring and summer of 1800 these recruits trained in the duties of 
riflemen and three companies participated in the abortive raid on Ferrol in Spain. During 
August, however, it was ordered that the drafts of men from the line regiments be 
returned to their respective corps, leaving only the recruits from the Irish Fencibles. In 
most cases all but a handful of these men returned to their regiments, but a few were 
shown on the returns from their regiments as being discharged and transferred to the Rifle 
Corps. At this point the Rifle Corps numbered 435 NCOs and other ranks and underwent 
2 Ibid., 23-25. 
3 Ibid., 21. On the 22nd of March 1800 there was an order to the regiments that had provided recruits to 
replace fifty-two men who were wlfit for duty. One of these regiments had provided twenty-two of these 
poor examples alone. 
4 Quoted in Verner, 21. From History of the Gordon Highlanders by Lt.-Col. Greenhill Gardyne. 
a transformation from a temporary corps of detachments to a regular corps gazetted in 
the line, so ordered by the Duke of York on 21 October 1800.5 
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The Rifle Corps now stood as a permanent organization within the British Army 
establishment. It only remained to fill out its ranks by recruiting and complete its 
discipline and training to create a combat ready formation. Recruits provide the raw 
material of any military formation and their background, character and selection 
determine the quality and capabilities of the corps of which they are a part. These 
recruits, however, cannot simply be brought together, handed weapons and equipment 
and be expected to make good soldiers. They must first be organized and disciplined in 
such a way as to make them capable of following orders and acting and looking like 
soldiers in whatever style of warfare trained for. Both the standards for recruiting and the 
style and method of discipline brought to the Rifle Corps and later the 95th would largely 
be the work of two men, Lieutenant Colonel William Stewart and Major General Sir John 
Moore. Their influence would create a model for the British Army to follow into the 
nineteenth century, a model well ahead of its time. 
Of all the countries of Europe involved in the war against France, England was 
the only one without a system of conscription. Indeed the British Army did not institute 
conscription until World War I. The system of recruitment employed by the British 
Army from 1800 through the end of the Napoleonic Wars made it extremely difficult for 
the regular army, the regiments that bore the brunt of the fighting and therefore the 
casualties, to obtain recruits. England essentially had three armies, the regular army, the 
militia and the Fencibles and Volunteers. The militia, Fencibles (in the process of being 
' 
5 Ibid., 28-29. 
phased out), and Volunteers were for home defense only and could not be ordered to 
serve overseas. They received good pay, high bounties for enlistment, a bounty being a 
cash inducement paid up front, with other benefits being paid to the family of a 
militiaman when he was serving in another part of the country. In 1802 the Fencibles 
were eliminated and by 1808 the Volunteers had been absorbed into the militia. The 
regular army was handicapped by its low pay and, prior to 1809, by a lifetime 
commitment of service. In 1809 the new option of seven years of service in the regular 
greatly increased the prospects of finding recruits. 6 
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The process of recruiting was relatively simple. A party of sergeants and 
corporals, perhaps accompanied by an officer and several drummers, would travel around 
the country recruiting for their regiment. There were no central recruiting offices and for 
the most part no community or county affiliations for the regiments. That would be a 
part of army reform in the 1870s. These recruiting parties would concentrate on militia 
meetings and country markets and fairs where there would be a large number of laborers 
and farm workers seeking employment. A majority of recruits were obtained from the 
militia because there were benefits for both parties. The recruiting parties offered large 
bounties to militiamen, sometimes up to forty-two pounds, or almost two years wages for 
a laborer, and the army got a partially trained recruit. 7 When times were tight and 
recruits scarce the recruiting parties were authorized to go to local magistrates and offer 
service in the army as an alternate to jail sentences or hanging. As urbanization increased 
a growing number of recruits came from the slums and rookeries of the great cities. It is 
6 S.J. Parle and G.F. Nafziger, The British Military. Its System and Organization, 1803~1815 
(Cambridge, Canada: Rafm Co. Inc., 1983), 14. 
7 Ibid. 
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perhaps from these recruits, enlisting to escape grinding poverty or to gain the promised 
daily ration of alcohol, that the myth developed that British soldiers were "the scum of 
the earth" and enlisted for drink as Wellington is often quoted as having believed. It was 
not uncommon for recruiting parties to spend a great deal of money getting potential 
recruits drunk to induce them to take the bounty and enlist. Once the bounty was paid, a 
shilling up front with more promised, a local doctor would make sure that the recruit was 
fit for service and the local magistrate would swear him in. The recruits would then be 
sent to the regimental barracks for training. Once at the barracks the new recruits lost a 
great deal of their bounty to "Stoppages." Necessary items such as clothing and 
accoutrements were paid for out of the bounty. These stoppages continued throughout a 
soldier's career as replacements for worn out items of clothing and food were paid for by 
deductions from a soldier's pay. 
The individual status, reputation, and posting of a regiment did a great deal to 
determine the success of its recruiting parties. The cavalry and Household regiments 
with their good reputation and flashy uniforms had a much easier time getting recruits 
and could be far more selective. The Highland regiments also found it easy to find 
recruits. Most were clan structures with many of its rank and file from the same clan. At 
the other end of the scale were regiments posted in the West Indies and India where 
disease was rampant and it was likely a replacement sent out would never return. 
Although on paper a British regiment numbered one thousand officers and men, most 
regiments ranged between four and eight hundred based on their posting, duty, and 
recruiting fortunes. 
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Officers received their commission by purchase from the government and gained 
promotion in a similar manner. Promotion from the ranks was rare and promotion 
through seniority and experience occurred only in regiments that had lost officers through 
disease or combat. Only the rank of general officer could not be purchased and it would 
not be until the army reforms of the Victorian era that minimum time in service and time 
in grade requirements along with professional skills requirements would be necessary to 
advance in rank. The purchase system was not abolished until 1881. 8 
The Rifle Corps had two distinct advantages during its initial recruiting period 
and would add another over the years. The first was that it was formed as the Fencibles 
were being disbanded. As stated above large drafts of men came from the Irish Fencible 
establishment, these men were already trained in the basics of military discipline and 
other skills and many volunteered for service in the Rifle Corps to continue their military 
service. The second advantage held by the Rifle Corps was its stature. It was an elite 
unit with a flashy uniform and an already growing reputation for derring do and an esprit 
de corps lacking in many line regiments. Recruiting posters for the Rifle Corps and later 
the 95th played up the distinctive green uniform and lack of pipe-clayed white belts 9, the 
uniqueness of the weapons and tactics, and the respect and comradeship of being in an 
elite unit. 10 The third advantage would develop through combat experience and a 
growing list of laurels and battle honors. 
Private Benjamin Harris, one of the 95th 's many published writers of memoirs, 
8 Ibid., I I. 
9 For a discussion of the distinctive Rifle uniform see Appendix I. 
10 Eileen Hathaway, A Dorset Rifleman. The Recollections of Benjamin Harris. With a Foreword by 
Bernard Cornwell (Swanagc, Dorset: Shinglcpicker Publications, 1995), 24. From a recruiting poster for 
the 95th in the Royal Green Jackets Museum, Peninsular Barracks, Winchester. 
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commented, "Whilst I Dublin, I saw a corps of the 95th Rifles, and fell so in love with 
their smart, dashing appearance, that nothing would serve me till I was a Rifleman 
myself." 11 Captain John Kincaid, an ensign in the North York Militia had similar reasons 
for transferring his commission to the 95th in 1809, recalling in his Random Shots From a 
Rifleman, 
On those occasions any subaltern who could persuade a given number of 
men to follow him, received a commission in whatever regiment of the 
line he wished, provided there was a vacancy for himself and followers. I 
therefore chose that which had long been the object of my secret 
adoration, as well for its dress as the nature of its services and 
achievements, the old ninety-fifth, now the Rifle Brigade. --"Hurrah for 
the first in the field and the last out of it, the bloody fighting ninety-fifth," 
was the cry of my followers while beating up for more recruits -- and as 
glory was their object, a fighting and a bloody corps the gallant fellows 
found it. ... " 12 
Recruiting for the Rifle Corps and later the 95th was so good that on 6 May 1805 a 
second battalion was raised. A core of trained men, NCOs and officers from the existing 
formation were transferred and the new unit filled out with drafts of recruits, mostly 
volunteers from the militia. In 1809 a third battalion was raised after a call for 338 
volunteers from the militia resulted in no less then 1,282 recruits stepping forward, such 
had the fame of the 95th become. 13 
With the Rifle Corps officially established and filled out with drafts from the 
Fencibles and new recruits it became necessary to begin turning civilians into soldiers. 
Before a new recruit can be instructed in the use of the weapons that are the tools of his 
trade and the tactics through which the capabilities of those weapons will be employed on 
11 Ibid., 19. At the time Harris was serving with the 66th Militia. He joined the 2nd Battalion, 95th on 8 
Au_gust, 1806. 
ri Captain John Kincaid, Random Shots From a Rifleman. With an introduction by Ian Fletcher 
(Kent: Spellmount Limited, 1998), 16. 
13 Verner, History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, vol. 2, 4. 
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the battlefield, it is necessary to instill the individual recruit with discipline. This is 
accompanied by a sense of team spirit, a mutual trust in the men with whom he serves 
and the NCOs and officers who lead him. The Rifle Corps, under the direction of one of 
its founders, Lieutenant Colonel William Stewart, and with further refinements from Sir 
John Moore, would pioneer a new style of discipline for the British Army. It would take 
time, but eventually the system established in the early years of the Rifle Corps, 1800-
1804, would filter through the rest of the British Army and became the basic system for 
instruction in military discipline in the armies of Europe and the west. 
Prior to the formation of the Rifle Corps the basic tactical unit for maneuver, 
combat, administration and discipline was the battalion. In the British Army of the 
period this consisted of ten companies commanded by a captain and several subalterns 
and numbering at full strength one hundred officers and other ranks. The company was 
not a true command in the modern sense of the word, an almost independent tactical 
formation capable of acting and fighting on its own, the captain in command simply had 
to ensure his movements and fire conformed to the orders of the battalion commander. 
Lieutenant Colonel Stewart, under the auspices of Colonel Coote Manningham made the 
company a real command, and a position of responsibility and importance within the 
battalion for the company commander. This, the Company System, as it would become 
known, was Stewart's primary contribution to the Rifle Corps and ultimately to the 
British Army. 
The basis of the Company System was professionalism at all ranks, discipline 
based on respect, pride and trust between officers and other ranks, and the development 
of a feeling of honor, community and family within each company. In his Regulations 
for the Rifle Corps, Stewart laid down the basis for this new system: 
Every inferior, whether officer or soldier shall receive the lawful 
commands of his superior with deference and respect, and shall execute 
them to the best of his power. Every superior in his turn, whether he be an 
Officer or a Non-commissioned Officer, shall give his orders in the 
language of moderation and of regard to the feelings of the individual 
under his command; abuse, bad language or blows being positively forbid 
in the Regiment. 14 
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He continued by setting forth a system of responsibility, initiative, and flexibility around 
each company and its cadre of officers and NCOs as well as the individual Riflemen, 
Every Officer and Non-commissioned Officer will observe that it is an 
invariable rule and principle in discipline that, in the absence of a superior, 
the whole of the duty or charge which was entrusted to that superior 
devolves upon the next in rank, so that a blank or chasm is never to exist 
in the various responsible situations of the corps .... In a Regiment of 
Riflemen each Company must be formed upon the principle of being 
separate from and totally independent of another. All the lieutenants are 
therefore equally divided and are never to be exchanged from Company to 
Company; and, if the necessity of the service may occasionally require a 
subaltern officer doing duty with another, he is always to return to his 
original company on the earliest opportunity .... 
This attention to retaining the same men and officers together is on 
account of Riflemen being liable to act very independently of each other 
and in numerous small detachments in the field when they will feel the 
comfort and utility of having their own Officer, Non-commissioned 
Officer and comrades with them. The service will be benefitted by the tie 
of friendship, which will more naturally subsist between them. 
In every half-platoon one soldier of merit will be selected, and upon 
him the charge of the squad devolves in the absence of both the Non-
commissioned Officers of it. As from among these four Chosen Men (as 
they are to be called) all Corporals are to be appointed; the best men alone 
are to be selected for this distinction. 
The gradation of rank and responsibility from the Colonel of the 
Regiment to the Chosen Men of a squad ... is in no instance to be varied 
by whatever Officer may command the corps. It is the groundwork of all 
other regulations of either discipline or interior economy, and the principle 
of it need on no occasion be necessarily lost sight of, however various the 
situations in which the Regiment may hereafter find itself and however 
14 Quoted Bryant, Jackets of Green, 23. 
inadequate the means at Headquarters of fully carrying into execution 
every minute part of it .... 15 
This was a wide divergence from the practices found in line infantry battalions where 
officers transferred between companies and indeed battalions on a regular basis and 
individual companies seldom, if ever, operated independently of the parent battalion. 
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Respect for senior Non-commissioned Officers and Officers was not to be 
neglected amidst this system of familiarity and mutual trust. "It is therefore an order 
from the Colonel that not only all Inferiors shall show ... respect to their Superiors in 
their several ranks, but that all Superiors, whether they be Commissioned or Non-
commissioned Officers, shall insist upon the same, never permitting without reprimand 
the smallest marked inattention or want of respect from those who are subordinates." 16 
Respect and honor, however, swung both ways and officers were expected to lead by 
example in all manner of things and must, "remember that example is the most powerful 
of all preceptors, and he will find that what he does not himself observe with regard to 
conduct will not be attended to . . . . From the Officers of the Regiment the Colonel 
expects every example of what is good and great in a Soldier's and Gentleman's 
character." 17 John Kincaid, who served with the 95th in the Peninsula, stated the utility 
and uniqueness of the Company System and the Rifle's style of discipline in his own 
clear and eloquent words," ... for the beauty of their system of discipline consisted in 
their doing everything that was necessary, and nothing that was not, so that every man's 
duty was a pleasure to him, and the esprit de corps was unrivalled." 18 
15 Ibid., 23-24. 
16 Ibid., 25. 
17 Ibid., 26. 
18 Kincaid, Random Shots from a Rifleman, 17. 
Lieutenant Colonel Stewart, with the full backing and support of Colonel 
Manningham, went even further than reforming the system of discipline in their new 
corps. Unlike most officers of the era, they took an active interest in the well being and 
education of the men under their command. In an age when education was restricted to 
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the relatively well off who could afford it, the Rifle Corps provided a regimental library 
and school of reading, writing, arithmetic, and geometry for the men, aiming in particular 
to foster the education of those who sought to become NCOs. Another first for the 
British Army, they created a system of medals and awards for Good Conduct, Long 
Service, and Special Merit. The Special Conduct medal, made of silver, was to be 
awarded to Riflemen not only for acts of courage but for "voluntary acts of generosity 
towards either an enemy or those in an enemy's country." 19 
As a new recruit Edward Costello, one of the 95th 's most famous rankers and 
memoirists, left an account of the impact that rewarding the men for good service made 
on the enlisted men, 
The first parade we had after our men had received their new 
equipment's [sic], was imprinted upon my memory from a circumstance 
attending it, that was well calculated to make an impression upon the mind 
of a youthful soldier, such as I then was; and to inspire that esprit de corps 
in a regiment, which is absolutely essential to even disciplined valour. I 
had previously, more than once, heard a man of the name of Tom Plunket 
eulogized by the men for his courage. He was a smart, well-made fellow, 
about middle height, in the prime of manhood; with a clear gray eye, and 
handsome countenance; and was a general favourite with both officers and 
men, besides being the best shot in the regiment. 
On the occasion I have alluded to, we were formed into hollow square, 
and ordered to face inwards; as we knew it was not a punishment parade, 
we naturally expected some address from the commanding officer, and 
wondering in our own minds what was coming, when Colonel Beckwith 
broke the silence by calling out: 'Private Thomas Plunket, step into the 
square.' 
19 Bryant, Jackets of Green, 27-28. 
All eyes, it is needless to say, were fixed upon Plunket, as he halted 
with his rifle shouldered, in the finest position of military attention, within 
a few paces of his officer. 
'Here, men,' exclaimed the commanding officer, pointing to Plunket, 
'here stands a pattern for the battalion!' Then addressing Tom he added, 
'I have ordered a medal for you, in approval of your late gallant conduct at 
Corunna. Present yourself, Sir, to the master tailor and get on a corporal's 
stripes, and I will see you do not want higher promotion, as you continue 
to deserve it. I love to reward conduct such as yours has hitherto been!' 
Making a salute, Tom retired, when we formed into column and 
marched back to our barracks, duly fired with a love of emulation to 
deserve the praise that had been bestowed on the fortunate Plunket. I have 
since often thought of the judicious conduct pursued by our Colonel in the 
foregoing instance, as I am convinced that it was attended with the 
happiest effects among many of the men, and, perhaps, indeed, induced 
much of that spirit of personal IBallantry and daring for which our corps 
afterwards became celebrated.2 
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Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Stewart encouraged the men under his command to 
take part in organized or individual sports which would be, "particularly characteristic of 
a light corps," and, "both of use in the field and tending to the health of Officers and 
Soldiers in quarters and in camp."21 Areas of the Rifle Corps' camps were set aside for 
football and cricket fields and dances held, open to the soldiers and local ladies. 
Swimming was strongly encouraged as, "the passage of rivers, and with British troops the 
frequent embarkation's and landings which they are liable to, call for this exercise." 22 
Lieutenant Colonel Stewart remained with the Rifle Corps until 1804, rising to 
become Colonel of the regiment and was then promoted to Brigadier-General, receiving 
command of a Militia District and transferred out of the Rifles. Direct command of the 
regiment passed to Lieutenant Colonel Sidney Beckwith, an officer who had been with 
20 AntJ1ony Brett-James, ed., Edward Costello: The Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1967.), 7-8 
21 Ibid., 28. 
22 lbid. 
the Rifles since its days as the Experimental Rifle Corps and who was to achieve fame 
and high command with the Rifles in the Peninsula. In January of 1803 the Rifle Corps 
was placed among the numbered Regiments of the Line, ninety-four of which existed at 
the time, becoming the "95th or Rifle Regiment." 23 The period 1803-1805 marked the 
final completion of the genesis of a new breed of soldier in the British Army at 
Shorncliffe, a small camp on the south coast of England. 
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The camp was formed in June 1803 with the purpose of defending the southern 
coastline of England from a feared invasion by Napoleon. Several regiments of militia 
and three regiments of the line were placed under the command of Sir John Moore, a 
remarkable officer with radical new views on discipline and light infantry duties. The 
95th joined the 52nd and 43rd Regiments, both newly restyled as Light Infantry Regiments. 
These three regiments formed the core of one of the finest fighting organizations the 
British Army ever fielded. 
Moore was a rarity among senior British Army officers in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries in that he was a true career military man interested more in his 
duties and responsibilities as a soldier then in political or economic advancement. The 
British Army had not seen his likes since Wolfe during the French and Indian War. Born 
in 1761 to a respectable upper middle class family, his father was a doctor and tutor to the 
young Duke of Hamilton, whom the Moore's accompanied on many tours through 
Europe. By age thirteen Moore was determined to make a career in the military and set 
to learning all he could of his chosen profession. In 1775, while in Prussi~, he met Field 
Marshal Sporken, who, taking an interest in Moore's passion, had a sergeant teach Moore 
23 Verner, History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, vol. 1, 72. 
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and the young Duke the Prussian drill and how to load and fire a musket.24 Letters from 
Moore's father, written during these excursions to Europe, show much of John Moore's 
character that was to play an important part in the nature of the system he was to 
eventually develop. The senior Moore observed that "his mind begins to expand, and he 
shows a great deal of vivacity tempered with good sense and benevolence; he is of a 
daring and intrepid temper, and of an obliging disposition." 25 While not a member of the 
aristocracy he was accepted by it and yet he did not allow any snobbishness to invade his 
personality. Again his father noted in his letters: 
Jack ... is always invited with the Duke (of Hamilton) and me, yet if, at 
the same time, he has an invitation from any of his old acquaintances, of a 
much humbler class, he always prefers the latter. I pressed him one day to 
go with us, because the people had insisted particularly on his coming; it 
was to a fine villa, and a most brilliant party. I could not prevail; he 
silenced me with this sentence: 'They who have invited me are poor, they 
were kind to me when the others did not think me worth their notice. ' 26 
In 1776 he entered the Army with a commission in the 51 st Regiment of Foot 
purchased for him by the Duke of Argyll. He served in the last campaigns of the 
American War oflndependence and returned to England as a Captain. In 1787 he was 
made a Major in the 60th Royal Americans and his special abilities to discipline men 
without resorting to punishment was noted by an early biographer who wrote of the 
"complete command he possessed over his own temper qualified him peculiarly for 
disciplining troops." To the officers under him he was, "friendly yet firm," to the other 
ranks, "kind, but strict - and to both impartially just." 27 In all matters pertaining to 
24 J.F.C. Fuller, Sir John Moore's System of Training (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1924), 17-18. 
25 Ibid., 18. 
26 Ibid., 18-19. 
27 Ibid., 19. These extracts are taken from The Life of Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, K B., by 
James Carrick Moore, vol. 2, 37. 
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military skills his discipline was strict, but in those relating to the comfort and well being 
of the men under his command he was indulgent and somewhat relaxed. 
By the age of twenty-nine, Moore was a Lieutenant Colonel and back with the 
51 st which he set about reforming in his own image. From 1794 to 1802 Moore was 
involved in a number of foreign expeditions in Corsica, the West Indies, Ireland, Holland, 
and Egypt in which he gained valuable experience in commanding troops, in particular 
light infantry, and an understanding of the manner of reforms needed to improve the 
army in general. In 1796, while Governor of St. Lucia in the West Indies, he wrote a 
letter to General Sir Ralph Abercromby explaining what he believed to be a serious flaw 
in the discipline and doctrine of the British Army relating to troops posted in the West 
Indies and other foreign stations. Moore also outlined a solution to the problem, a reform 
in the selection and training of Young Officers: 
... with a Roman, instead of a modem exercise and discipline, the troops 
in the West Indies might, I am convinced, be kept healthy. A parade twice 
a day ... is easy for officers; it leaves them what they call more time; but 
it leaves the soldier also to lounge the whole day in a barrack where the air 
cannot be good, and where, from indolence, his body becomes enervated 
and liable to disorder .... I fear the same fate (should the war continue) 
will attend whatever troops are sent out, unless serious attention is paid to 
get proper officers to put at the head of regiments, who will re-establish 
discipline, and inspire those under them with some of that zeal and ardour, 
which I am not too young to have seen, but which you must recollect so 
much better to have existed, in the Service. Such officers, I am sure, still 
exist in the British Army, though they are not to be found exclusively 
amongst those who have most money or most political interest.28 
In 1799 he was appointed Colonel of the 52nd by the King for his services in 
Holland. In 1802 he returned to England to a series of postings in which he was 
responsible for administration of the cut backs in the British Army following the 
28 Ibid., 23-24. 
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campaign in Egypt. On 2 October 1802, Moore sent orders to Lieutenant Colonel 
Stewart, then at Chatham Barracks, to march the Rifles to Shomcliffe. In the orders he 
wrote, "I hope you will find the station at Shomcliffe adapted both to your target practice 
and field movements." 29 On 10 January 1803, while himself at Chatham, Moore 
dispatched an order to Horse Guards declaring that the 2nd Battalion of the 52nd Regiment 
of Foot was to become the 96th Regiment. Transfers between the two corps were to be 
made on certain conditions assigned at a later date. On 18 January the 52nd was 
reorganized and refitted as a light infantry formation, officers and men were reassigned 
between the two units so that the 52nd should be, "supplied with men suitable for light 
infantry work." 30 The 52nd joined the 95th at Shomcliffe and they were soon reinforced 
by the arrival of the 43rd, also converted to light infantry. Sir John Moore was then 
stationed at Shomcliffe himself on the orders of the Duke of York, tasked with the 
defense of the south of England. Moore now began his work of reform. 
At the heart of Moore's system was Stewart's Company System, reinforced by a 
concentration on the relationship to be developed between officers and other ranks and 
the professional education of both junior and senior officers. Prior to the formation of the 
Shomcliffe training system, sixty-five out of one hundred new officers upon joining their 
companies had received no formal military instruction of any kind,31 the others had 
served in the militia or received commissions from the ranks. 
To Moore the officers were to be the driving force behind his new light infantry, 
especially in the Rifles since the individual company commander was expected to act 
29 Ibid., 39. 
Jo Sir J. F. Maurice, ed., The Diary of Sir John Moore, vol. 2 (London: Edward Arnold, 1904), 67. 
31 Michael Glover, Wellington's Army. In the Peninsula 1808-1814 (New York: Hippocrene Books, 
1977), 40-41. 
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independently on most occasions. They were created from the bottom up as soldiers and 
instilled with a responsibility to and an understanding of the enlisted soldiers under their 
command. To accomplish this when a new Young Officer, or Officer Candidate, arrived 
at Shorncliffe he initially drilled as a private among the men he was to command. He had 
to learn how to march and shoot as, " ... an officer who has no knowledge of the theory 
and practice of war, no experience in the handling and commanding of men, will not, 
because he cannot, educate and train a crowd of men into a company or regiment of 
soldiers." 32 The officer was a teacher as well as a leader. The Lieutenant Colonel in 
command of a battalion must be able to instruct his company commanders in their duties, 
they in turn should be able to instruct the lieutenants and subalterns in their companies 
who would then teach the other ranks. 
To attain this respect and affection, high standards were required and maintained 
by the system of discipline in use at Shorncliffe. The soldiers, and they were considered 
soldiers before all else, whether officer or enlisted, were expected to refrain from 
drunkenness and to dress and act like soldiers at all times. To Moore this did not mean a 
return to the foppish dress favored by many other officers and the obsession with 
pipeclay and hair powder. It meant simple pride, uniformity and neatness in one's 
appearance. The Rules and Regulations of the Rifle Corps, set down by Stewart and 
adopted by Moore, clearly defined the goals and manner of discipline maintained by the 
new Light Brigade, "real discipline implies obedience and respect wherever it is due on 
the one hand, and on the other a just but energetic use of command and responsibility." 33 
32 Fuller, Sir John Moore's System of Training, 105. 
33 Quoted in Ibid., 123. 
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While studying Sir John Moore's system of discipline it is of importance to 
examine the study of military discipline published by Robert Jackson while Moore was 
carrying out his training at Shomcliffe. This work, A Systematic View of the Formation, 
Discipline, and Economy of Armies, was available to Moore and a comparison of his 
views with Jackson's indicates that Moore was greatly influenced by Jackson's study. 
Jackson was a strong proponent of individual training similar to the Company System 
adopted by Stewart and Moore and believed company officers should posses individual 
knowledge of their men so the most could be made form the strengths and weaknesses of 
each soldier. Jackson, like Moore, also believed that leadership by example, experience 
and study were the keys to military prowess and ability. 
The last resort of discipline is the infliction of punishment. In the British Army, 
based on the system of Frederick the Great, flogging was the method of punishment 
prescribed for almost any crime or failure of duty. Two hundred and fifty to five hundred 
lashes were not uncommon for even minor offenses, with examples ofup to one thousand 
lashes being administered. Desertion to the enemy in battle and extreme cases of rape and 
pillage were punishable by death, either by firing squad or hanging. 
Moore believed the use of the lash to be criminal in all but the most serious of 
offenses and took great pains to ensure that flogging was seldom employed within his 
command. Despite his efforts flogging continued in the British Army until near the end 
of the nineteenth century. Under Moore's system, punishment at Shomcliffe fell into two 
general categories depending on the crime and the rank of the perpetrator. Private 
punishment was given for the most minor crimes and could be inflicted on all those of the 
rank Corporal or below. Its use was encouraged as it spared the "public shame of the 
Soldier, and the public disgrace of the corps .... "34 
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The punishment was inflicted only after the perpetrator was judged guilty by a 
Company Courts Martial. He was tried by a court composed of a Corporal as president, a 
Chosen Man and three Privates for cases involving Privates and Buglers, or three 
Sergeants and two Corporals if the defendant was a Corporal. The Company Sergeant 
Major kept a log of the trial and punishment, if any, and no punishment was carried out 
without the approval of the Company's Duty Officer of the Day. Punishments could 
range from extra duty, confinement to barracks, turned coats (a real dishonor when a 
military coat, its color, facings, lace and buttons, signified a place among equal peers and 
a home), fines (money to be used in the company mess), and cobbing (caning on the 
buttocks). 35 Sergeants could be confined to quarters, or reprimanded privately or publicly 
for minor infractions, depending on the wishes of their commanding officer. 
Public punishments were for more serious crimes and they were classified under 
four headings: confinement, confinement with a turned coat or disgrace, prison, or 
flogging for the most serious offenses such as theft. As with private punishments a trial 
was held with the entire regiment present, the crime and punishment being recorded in 
the Regiment's "black book." 36 
Officers were expected to prevent crime through leadership by example and 
instilling a sense of pride and honor in their men, not to simply punish crime after the 
fact. With the reforms instituted at Shorncliffe the regiments of the Light Division 
34 Ibid., 128. From Rules and Regulations of the Rifle Corps. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 129-130. 
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achieved an unparalleled rise in discipline and morale," ... for whether units joined him 
[Moore] good, indifferent, or bad, they all left him as near perfect as it was possible for 
them to be."37 Throughout the Peninsular Campaign there were fewer cases of disorderly 
conduct or crime in the Light Division than in any other formation in the army. With the 
Rifle Corps organized and disciplined Sir John Moore next commenced instructing them 
in the duties of Riflemen, a new doctrine contrary to traditional practice. 
37 Ibid., 45. 
Chapter 3 
Sharpening the Sword: Rifle Doctrine, the Tactical Duties of the Rifleman in Battle. 
The domain of strategy is beyond the scope of this work, but the tactical problems 
faced by the British Army, Napoleon's most consistent if not largest opponent, 
demonstrate a remarkable ability, at the regimental level at least, to meet and overcome a 
powerful foe. Doctrine is the application of a system of drill and training on the 
battlefield in order to achieve certain goals, such as the capture of a key terrain feature, 
the turning of an enemy's flank, or holding a key village or road. The wars of the late 
eighteenth century and of the French Revolution increased in savagery and scope over the 
limited wars of previous decades. A new dimension in the manner in which wars were 
fought was developing at both the strategic and tactical level; a fundamental shift in the 
doctrine of the warring nations was under way. 
The newly raised Rifle Corps in particular faced a difficult situation, being forced 
to adopt and implement a tactical doctrine in time of war with little or no professional 
experience. As seen in the previous chapters the long struggle to create a professional 
corps of riflemen in the British Army was paid for in blood. It now fell to the officers 
who had raised and disciplined this new corps of riflemen to give it a doctrine that would 
enable it to act as an effective fighting force on the battlefield. 
It is of some considerable importance to note that the rifleman, like artillery and 
cavalry, was a supporting arm of the British Army, the regular line infantryman with his 
smoothbore musket, the massed volley and charge with cold steel was the decisive force 
on the battlefield. Until the advent of the breech loading and ultimately the magazine 
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loading rifle, the firepower of the infantry was limited to such a degree that truly 
"modern" tactics, those of the green jacketed rifleman were limited in scope. The 
importance and utility of this support provided by rifleman must not be overlooked. 
While the proper employment of the regular infantry proved the decisive factor on the 
outcome of a battle, the actions of the rifleman before, during and very often after a 
battle, could tip the balance in favor of the British Army. 
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The Company System was the cornerstone of the system of discipline created for 
the Rifle Corps by Lieutenant Colonel Stewart and reinforced by Sir John Moore at 
Shomcliffe. This was also the basis of the new doctrine created for the riflemen. Unlike 
Regiments of the Line which rarely fought in formations smaller than a battalion and 
usually in brigades of two or more battalions, the Rifle Corps was expected often, if not 
always, to fight as single companies. Off of the battlefield, as patrols, piquets and 
outposts, riflemen operated in even smaller detachments of squads and platoons. A 
captain in command of a company of riflemen truly held a position of command, rather 
like the captain of a naval vessel, he received orders of intent from his battalion 
commander but the details of how those orders were to be carried out was largely left up 
to him. 
In support of the army on campaign the Rifle Corps was to be employed in a wide 
number of tasks, both on the offense and defense. In 1803, Colonel Coote Manningham, 
one of the founding officers, delivered a series oflectures to the officers of the 95th at 
Shorncliffe outlining their duties. The opening paragraph plainly laid out the role the 95th 
would play for the army on campaign: 
Light troops are, as it were, a light or beacon for the General, which 
should constar:itly inform him of the situation, the movements and nature 
of the enemy's designs. It is upon the exactness and intelligence of what 
they report that he is enabled to regulate the time and manner of executing 
his own enterprises. The Officer who is deprived of this support, being 
ignorant of what his enemy is preparing to execute, his views on every 
occasion anticipated, and arriving constantly too late to prevent some 
mischief, will experience daily losses, checks without end and such 
disheartening circumstances as may lead eventually to a general defeat. 
The safety of an army, the justness of those measures which have so direct 
an influence upon success, depend frequently on the vigilance, the 
expertness and the superiority of the light troops compared with those of 
the enemy. 1 
The next paragraph laid out the duties of the rifle officers, 
Every officer of light troops should know how to occupy a post, how to 
keep it, how to support it, or to retire from it when requisite. He should be 
well acquainted with the means and precautions necessary to secure 
himself upon all marches, how to penetrate the enemy's chain of sentries, 
to reconnoitre his position, his force and his movements, the 
circumstances which favour an attack upon those places he mal occupy, 
as well as such as are unfavourable to himself when attacking. 
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The Rifle Corps performed the duties for the commanding general of an army that 
Special Forces units, Military Intelligence, photo and signal intelligence organizations 
and even satellite imagery carry out today. In the era of horse and musket it was a large 
and difficult responsibility. Training began with the basics, drill, rifle handling and 
marksmanship, and progressed through the tactics to be employed on campaign. The 
bulk of rifle doctrine adopted by Stewart and Moore was based on Rottenburg' s 
Regulations/or the Exercise of Riflemen and Light Infantry, Mannigham' s Lectures and 
Captain Neil Campbell's Instructions for Light Infantry and Riflemen. 
Training was intensive and lengthy, with individual drill and movements taught 
first with larger and larger numbers of recruits being brought together until a whole 
1 Colonel Coote Manningham, Military Lectures delivered to the Officers of the 95th (Rifle) Regiment at 
Shornclijfe Barracks, Kent, during the Spring of 1803 (London: T. Egerton, 1803), 1. 
2 Ibid., 2. 
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battalion would be trained to act together. One Rifle officer, Captain John Cross, who 
later wrote a simplified version of standard drill for light infantry based on Sir David 
Dundas' s system, entitled A System of Drill and Maneuvers, stated in his introduction 
that "instructors will be appointed to the classes in progressive order, according to their 
qualifications; and they are not, on any account, to proceed from one lesson to another. .. 
until they are expressly ordered to do so .... "3 Before moving on to the unique drill and 
formations employed by riflemen the recruits were instructed in a simplified version of 
regular infantry drill so that they could operate in concert with regular infantry if 
necessary. While many regular battalions still trained with the three deep line, the Rifle 
Corps employed the loose two, deep line adopted in the Americas. 
Musketry, the proper employment of the rifle, followed instruction in drill. The 
Baker Rifle, adopted by the Rifle Corps, provided a number of advantages over the 
smooth bore musket employed by the line and light infantry. Proper instruction in its use 
was vital. 4 Rottenburg' s system was simple and methodical, based on three groups of 
three lessons, each of which utilized the inherent accuracy of the rifle to its full effect, 
proceeding in the following manner: 
First, the recruit was taught the manual exercise in order to accustom him 
to handle his arms smartly; secondly, how to shoot; and, thirdly, how to 
extend, that is place himself in a position to use his rifle or musket. These 
three lessons mastered, the next three were begun. These were: firing in 
extended order, firing advancing, and firing retiring. The last three were 
the tactical application of the former six: Skirmishing, the Formation of 
the Chain, and the Formation of the Advanced Guard. The whole system, 
being based on musketry, had, as its object, the protection in movement or 
at rest of the heavy infantry of the line. 
3 Fuller, Sir John Moore's System, 166. 
4 For a discussion of the development and characteristics of the Baker Rifle see Appendix IL 
5 Fuller, Sir John Moore's System, 167-168. 
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The use of extended order to fire allowed individual and therefore aimed fire, 
greatly increasing the possibility of scoring hits against the enemy, this being the true 
goal of the rifleman, accurate fire with the intent of causing casualties among the enemy. 
These training methods remain constant today, recruits in Basic Training first learning 
the manual of arms followed by intensive training on a rifle range to teach marksmanship 
in controlled situations and completed by firing under simulated combat situations. The 
company commanders maintained records of shooting skills and to encourage practice 
and skill a system of distinctions was created similar to the good conduct medals, with 
three classes of marksmanship. The best, or marksmen, wore a green cockade on their 
shakos, above the universal black national cockade. Second class shots wore a white 
cockade.6 The extent of true marksmanship taught in the regular infantry of the day was 
the leveling of muskets, ensuring all of the musket barrels pointed in the same general 
direction and at the correct trajectory based on the estimated range to the enemy. The 
close formations, confusion, smoke and noise of volley fire prevented accurate fire. 
Once trained to handle his weapon, the rifleman learned the rest of his trade, the 
officer the necessary commands and applications, the soldier how, when and where to 
move. As previously noted, tactics fall basically into two different categories, offensive 
and defensive. There are, of course, always exceptions to any general rule and some 
tactics based on application and circumstance fall into both. The skirmish line was the 
most commonly used formation of the Rifle Corps on the battlefield and served both 
offensive and defensive purposes. With time and the advent of modem weapons, the 
breech-loading, magazine fed rifle firing smokeless powder and the machine-gun, the 
6 Ibid., 183-184. 
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skirmish chain became the dominant tactical formation of the infantry. For this reason 
the skirmish line or extended order is discussed first. All movements and formations 
discussed below are based on a battalion of riflemen operating by companies and in two 
ranks. 
A rifle company consisted of two platoons, further broken down into four sections 
or squads, two per platoon. A captain commanded the company with a subaltern officer, 
a lieutenant or second lieutenant commanded each platoon, and sergeants commanded 
sections. Each company also included a bugler posted with the captain to pass orders to 
the men beyond the range of spoken or shouted commands. The officers and sergeants 
also carried whistles on their cross belts for similar purposes. At full strength a company 
numbered one hundred officers and men but on campaign this figure obviously varied 
based on casualties and sickness. 
The skirmish line in reality was formed of three distinct parts, the firing line, the 
supports and the reserve. Upon receiving the order to form a skirmish line, one platoon 
from each company trailed arms and advanced forward, accompanied by the captain, 
bugler and platoon commander. The remaining second platoons stayed in the rear with 
the battalion commander. This formation, half of the battalion, was the reserve. It 
provided reinforcements for the firing line, a formed counter-attack force, a position to 
fall back upon, or a formed body to cover a retreat if necessary. The advancing platoons, 
commanded by the senior of the battalions two majors again split itself some distance in 
front of the reserve based on the distance to the enemy and terrain. One section of each 
platoon halted and formed up with the others in close order. Here remained the company 
commanders and the buglers. Known as the support, this formation provided close aid to 
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the firing line, replaced casualties and watched the flanks to prevent envelopment by the 
enemy's own skirmishers. The last sections, a quarter of the battalion again advanced 
and extended, up to six paces between men according to Rottenburg, based on 
advantageous cover and concealment. This was the firing line. The men operated in 
pairs or "files," a front rank and rear rank man. The Company System ensured that these 
two men had undergone all of their training together and were well acquainted. 
With the skirmish line in place fire and movement commenced. Firing was 
carried out in such a manner that at least one man in each rank was loaded at all times, 
ensuring the skirmish line was always ready to fire. When not moving fire was to be 
given as follows: 
"At the signal to commence fire the front rank makes ready, 
presents (each man selecting his particular object) and fires; as soon as the 
rear rank man sees his file leader put the ball in his piece, he makes ready, 
and fires through the intervals of the front rank; and when the rear rank 
men have got their balls into their pieces, each man gives notice to his file 
leader to fire. In this manner the fire is continued on the spot till the signal 
is given to cease firing."7 
Fire was also issued on the move, advancing and retiring. Upon the order to advance: 
... the rear rank moves briskly six paces before the front rank, each man 
having passed to the right of the file leader, makes ready, takes his aim, 
and fires; and as soon as he has loaded again, trails his rifle. When the 
sergeant of the front rank sees the rear rank has fired, he steps in front, 
gives a signal with his whistle, upon which the front rank moves briskly 
six paces before the rear rank, each man then presents, takes aim, and 
fires; following the directions that have been given to the rear rank. Thus 
each rank continues advancing and firing alternately. 8 
Campbell's instructions provide a little more realism, taking advantage of cover and 
7 Baron Francis de Rotten burg. Regulations for the Exercise of Riflemen and Light Infantry and 
Instructions for their conduct in the Field. (London: T. Egerton, 1803.) 18. 
8 Ibid., 19. 
where necessary firing from the kneeling, sitting, and prone positions. Fire was also 
conducted while retiring, in exactly the reverse of advancing except that loading was 
performed while on the move. 
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All movement conformed to the body to the rear, the firing line conformed to the 
movements of the supports, the supports to the reserve and the reserve to the main body 
of the army. If forced to retire by an overwhelming enemy advance, the firing line first 
fell back upon the supports and if necessary continued to the reserve. This movement 
was made to the flanks in order to leave a clear line of sight and thus fire between the 
friendly formation and the enemy. 
The primary purpose of the skirmish line was to screen the main body of the 
army. On the defense the skirmishers bloodied the nose of the advancing enemy. The 
highly accurate rifles allowed them to single out the enemy's officers and NCOs, as well 
as the gunners of accompanying artillery. This galling fire lowered the enemy's morale 
and, if very successful, forced the enemy to halt and open fire or deploy and attack to 
sweep the skirmishers out of the way. All infantry attacks were based on maintaining the 
morale of the attacking force and on sheer impetus, the first volley, with all muskets 
loaded being the most effective. By forcing the enemy to halt and fire the will to attack 
was drained from the enemy. Soldiers were much more comfortable in an extended 
firefight at long distances than in close melee with the bayonet, the riflemen then killed 
off the motivated officers and NCOs as they urged their men on to attack. If the enemy 
charged the skirmishing rifles they retired to the flanks to return when the enemy fell 
back. If the enemy assault came within musket range of the main line of heavy infantry 
the rifles would also retire to the flanks to continue harassing the enemy while the massed 
muskets and bayonets of the intact main line crushed the attack. On the attack the 
riflemen carried out much the same role, screening the movements of their army so that 
the enemy were never sure where the weight of the attack would fall, forcing the enemy 
to waste their first and most destructive volley on the dispersed and elusive skirmishers. 
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Riflemen found employment on the battlefield beyond their role as skirmishers in 
the main line of battle. One task, for which the long-range accuracy of the Baker Rifle 
was especially suited, was the suppression of enemy artillery. Although opposing 
batteries of artillery did occasionally engage in long-range duels with one another, 
counter battery fire would not truly come into its own until the First World War. The role 
of artillery on the Napoleonic battlefield was to support the infantry and cavalry with 
direct fire and to shatter the enemy's morale through infliction of casualties. The fact that 
most pieces of field artillery employed in this era were capable only of direct fire placed 
them among the infantry or cavalry they were intended to support. While the closely 
massed ranks of line infantry presented perfect targets for the gunners, especially if they 
were forced into squares by the presence of cavalry, riflemen, dispersed in pairs and 
taking advantage of cover and concealment, made poor targets indeed. By utilizing the 
capabilities of their weapons, accuracy out to a range ofup to three hundred yards, 
groups of riflemen could effectively suppress enemy artillery with little fear of 
retribution. Suppression was achieved by maintaining a steady fire upon the gunners and, 
perhaps more importantly, upon their horses. A battery of artillery without horses was as 
useless as one without ammunition or gunners. The guns, each weighing several tons, 
instantly would be immobilized, unable to move forward in support of advancing infantry 
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or cavalry and in the event of defeat, unable to move from the field of battle, they became 
prizes for the enemy. 
The other vital task carried out by the rifleman, with the support of musket armed 
light infantrymen, cast one eye back to the initial crisis that lead to the creation of the 
Rifles in the British Army, and one forward to a problem that military theorists seek an 
adequate answer to in the present, the occupation and defense of broken, irregular or 
urban terrain. Contrary to much popular myth the battlefields of the Napoleonic Wars 
were not tournaments fought on pool table-like terrain of gently rolling hills and fields. 
As stated earlier the urbanization of the population and enclosure of fields in northern 
Europe made for very close terrain with a landscape filled with small walled farms and 
villages, hedged fields, sunken roads, irrigation ditches and isolated copses and woods of 
small tangled trees and thick undergrowth. Portugal and Spain, the main arenas of 
combat for the 95th, while less developed than northern Europe presented its own tactical 
problems through its sheer remoteness and rugged terrain. The Portuguese/Spanish and 
Spanish/French frontiers, dominated by mountains and the associated deep, fast, water 
courses, were terrain nightmares for an army on campaign. Most battlefields also 
featured man-made structures of one type or another and these tended to become pivotal 
points on the battlefield, ready made fortifications for whichever side occupied them that 
could dominate fields of fire and avenues of approach. Parties of riflemen often found 
themselves, usually mixed with regular light infantry whose faster loading muskets 
provided a greater volume of fire at closer ranges, occupying broken terrain, woods, 
farmhouses, and villages on the flanks or in front of the main line of battle. This was 
acting upon the basic military tenant that an obstacle to the enemy not covered by fire is 
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useless in preventing his advance. More often than not they were successfully held. The 
rocky slopes of the battlefield at Bussaco in 1810, the woods and rocks on the flank of the 
British Army at Fuentes de Onoro in 1811, the hedgerows on the Ligny road at Quatre 
Bras on 16 June 1815 and the Sand Pit and Hedgerows at Waterloo on 18 June provide 
important examples. 
In his experiences in the Peninsula, Kincaid found himself fighting through trees 
with his men. He explained the dangers of fighting in close terrain and the advantages of 
rifle discipline and doctrine when faced with this situation: 
Be it known then, that I was one of a crowd of skirmishers who were 
enabling the French ones to carry the news of their own defeat through a 
thick wood, at an infantry canter, when I found myself all at once within a 
few yards of one of their regiments in line, which opened such a fire, that 
had I not, rifleman like, taken instant advantage of the cover of a good fir 
tree, my name would have unquestionably been transmitted to posterity by 
that night's gazette. And, however opposed it may be to the usual system 
of drill, I will maintain, from that day's experience, that the cleverest 
method of teaching a recruit to stand to attention, is to place him behind a 
tree and fire balls at him; as, had our late worthy disciplinarian, Sir David 
Dundas, himself been looking on. I think that even he must have admitted 
that he never saw anyone stand so fiercely upright as I did behind mine.9 
The duties of the rifleman did not start or end on the battlefield. It is no wonder 
that "Hurrah for the first in the field and the last out of it, the bloody fighting Ninety-
fifth ! "became the recognized toast for the Rifles. Like the motto of the modern United 
States Marine Corps, "First to Fight," it symbolized the many and varied roles of the 
riflemen. An army on the move in the Napoleonic era was a cumbersome, vulnerable 
thing, weighted down by the long tail of camp followers and supply trains attached to it. 
The generals commanding the brigades and divisions were blinded by the sheer size of 
9 Captain John Kincaid, Adventures in the Rifle Brigade. With an introduction by Ian Fletcher (Kent: 
Spellmount Limited, 1998), 49-50. 
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the thing, unable to see the forest for the trees as it were. Any information on the nature 
of the surrounding terrain and movements and intentions of the enemy was of vital 
importance. Much of the work of screening the movements of the army, and of gathering 
intelligence on the enemy was accomplished by the Light Cavalry, Hussars and 
Dragoons. Cavalry, however, could not operate in a vacuum and it usually fell to the 
riflemen to provide advanced and rear guards for the army on the move and patrols on its 
flanks and ahead to determine the lay of the land, to be Manningham' s "Beacon for the 
General." 
Both Rottenburg and Captain Cross dealt extensively with the duties of advanced 
and rear guards. Cross laid out the basic tenants of the advanced guard in such a way as 
to encourage initiative and basic common sense in the Rifle officer or NCO: 
The distance at which an advance guard and flank patrol should keep from 
a column must be determined by local circumstances and the strength of 
the column; they should, however, be always at such a distance that, if 
they should be attacked, the column may have time to put itself in a 
posture of defense ... detached files must examine carefully all houses and 
enclosures within their reach. . . . On coming to a house, an enclosure, or 
a hill, a single file of those detached parties will advance and examine it, 
the other remaining behind watching its motions, and ready to give 
. h . d io assistance w en requ1re . 
In Rules and Regulations Rottenburg made equally clear and useful 
recommendations while not limiting the riflemen to textbook solutions to real world 
problems and it is worth quoting at length in order to demonstrate the nature of doctrine 
developed for the 95th : 
Skirmishers, whether from the flank patrols or advanced guard, are to stop 
every person they meet, to question them respecting the enemy. . . . The 
commander of an advanced guard or flank patrol will at all times make an 
exact report to the Commanding Officer of the column of anything 
10 Quoted in Fuller, Sir John Moore's System of Training, 196-197. From Cross's, A System of Drill and 
Maneuvers. 
extraordinary that may occur during the march, or of any remarkable 
feature of the country. . .. 11 
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Upon contact with the enemy the leader of the advanced guard or flank patrol was to take 
immediate action, halting and determining the strength and nature of the enemy, 
... and then fall back on the main body; the commanding officer of which, 
if the enemy is not in too great force, should try to conceal his men, suffer 
the enemy to approach, and endeavour to entangle him between his parties 
and the head of the column. 12 
At all costs the advanced guard was not to fall back directly upon the main 
column. If forced to retire by weight of numbers it was to fire and retire as slowly as 
possible, attempting to force the enemy to deploy and thus buy time for the main column 
to react. While retiring, the riflemen of the advanced guard were to make use of all 
available cover and concealment and take as circuitous a route back to the main force as 
possible. Thus the enemy could not simply follow them back into the midst of re-
deploying force, catching them unprepared. 
As the officers of the 95th gained experience in battle they developed their own 
theories on the tactics they employed. Captain John Kincaid being among their number 
and possessed of a sharp wit as well as a keen eye for tactical development laid down his 
own thoughts on the composition and duties of an advanced guard in Random Shots From 
a Rifleman: 
In an open country a few squadrons of dragoons shoved well to the front 
will procure every necessary information; but in a close country, I hold the 
following to be the best advanced guard. 
1st_ A subaltern with twelve hussars, throwing two of them a hundred 
yards in front, and four at fifty. 
2nd• A section of riflemen or light infantry at fifty yards. 
Jrd. The other three sections of the company at fifty yards. 
11 Rottcnburg, Rules and Regulations, 42-43. 
12 Ibid., 43. 
4th . Four companies oflight infantry at a hundred yards, with 
communicating files, and followed closely by two pieces of horse artillery, 
and a squadron of dragoons. 
On falling in with the enemy, the advanced videttes will fire off their 
carabines to announce it, and if their opponents fall back they will 
continue their onward movement. If they do not, the intermediate four 
will join them, and try the result of a shot each; when, if the enemy still 
remain, it shews that they decline taking a civil hint, which, if they are 
infantry, they assuredly will; and the dispositions must be made 
accordingly While the remaining hussars are therefore dispatched to 
watch the flanks, the leading section of infantry will advance in 
skirmishing order, and take possession of the most favourable ground near 
the advanced videttes. The other three sections will close up to within 
fifty yards, one of them, if necessary, to join the advanced one, but a 
subdivision must remain in reserve. The guns will remain on the road, and 
the dragoons and infantry composing the main body of the advanced guard 
will be formed on the flanks, in such a manner as the ground will admit, so 
as to be best ready for either attack or defense; and in that disposition they 
will wait further orders, presuming that the officer commanding the 
division will not be a hundred miles off. 
The foregoing applies more particularly to the following of an enemy 
whom you have not lately thrashed, whereas, if following a beaten one, he 
ought never to be allowed a moment's respite so long as you have force 
enough of any kind up to shove him along. He ought to be bullied every 
inch of the way with dragoons and horse artillery, and the infantry brought 
to bear as often as possible. 13 
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While advancing through hostile territory or if the enemy is pursuing the column, 
the formation of a rearguard was of vital importance: "No column is ever to march 
without a rear-guard .... When an army retires before an enemy in several columns, each 
having his own rear-guard, they will preserve a communication with one another, and in 
common cover the retreat of the army." 14 The purpose of the rearguard was not to get 
tied down in a fight with the enemy but rather to delay him, it being "a fixed principle 
that the rear-guard should dispute every defile as long as possible, in order to enable the 
13 Kincaid, Random Shots From a Rifleman, 316-318. 
14 Rottcnburg, Rules and Regulations, 48. 
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column to gain ground .... "15 Rottenburg stressed cooperation at all times in his work as 
one of the key principles of rifle doctrine, thus reinforcing the Company System, 
demonstrating this in the manner in which he described how a rearguard should retire in 
the face of the enemy: 
If a rear-guard should be pursued by the enemy, it will divide itself into 
two bodies, which will continue to retreat in communication with one 
another, sending out several skirmishers, who will extend themselves by 
two's, and fire in retiring. The skirmishers must preserve as good a line as 
possible; the two bodies will retire alternately, the one covering the retreat 
of the other. 16 
Even while the army was at rest, bivouacking over night, or in cantonments for 
extended periods of time between campaigns, the riflemen expected no respite from their 
duties. The perimeter of the army was protected by outposts and patrols, composed like 
the advanced and rearguards, of light cavalry and riflemen or light infantry. Of all of the 
duties carried out by riflemen, the establishment of outposts, or piquets, was probably the 
most difficult to effectively master. This was because it involved the deployment of small 
numbers of riflemen often at extensive distances from the main body of the army, usually 
in unfamiliar terrain and in close proximity to the enemy. 
Like the formation of the skirmish line, the picquets were composed of three 
distinct divisions. Individual companies of riflemen were usually tasked with providing 
piquets for a given sector of the perimeter. Of this company half of it, one platoon, was 
held back as a reserve to support the advanced positions in event of crisis. The platoons 
and companies were rotated if the post was held over an extended period of time in order 
to provide relief to those on the piquets and give everyone a fair share of the duty. The 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 50. 
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second platoon of the company was again split, one section positioning itself about 
midway between the reserve and the advanced posts to act as a line of communication 
and support the piquets closely in a similar manner to the supports of the skirmish line. 
The remaining section broke down into groups of two to four men, again based on local 
terrain and weather conditions, observing enemy movement. At night the outlying 
sentries fell back upon the support but half of the present men remained under arms at all 
times. The piquet occupied different ground at night then it had during the day to prevent 
the enemy making use of any observations they had been able to make. The ground 
before the line of sentries was patrolled so as to ensure all avenues of approach were well 
known. The officer commanding the piquet studied the lay of the land and judged the 
capacity of local roads, bridges and fords for handling infantry, cavalry and artillery. It 
was then his duty to pass this information on to the officers relieving him. He was also 
expected to question anyone attempting to cross his piquet line to determine what 
information they may hold about the enemy or the local area, and what their business in 
his camp was. In the event of the piquet being attacked the officer commanding ensured 
that the enemy be delayed as long as possible in order to allow the army to prepare itself. 
If forced to retreat he was to give ground slowly, harassing the enemy's flanks with rifle 
fire and falling back by a route that would not lead the enemy right into his own lines. 
The commander of the reserve would bring up his men to strengthen the piquet if 
possible; if not they would attempt to get on the enemy's flanks and slow down their 
advance. 
Rottenburg believed that the efficiency of the officer defined how effective the 
piquet line would be and stated: 
On picket and other duties, where the service is inseparable from the 
greatest hardships, it is the duty of every officer to set his men a good 
example, not to be laying down and resting himself when the men are 
under arms, nor to go under cover while they are without shelter, but 
share, in common with them, every danger and fatigue: by his example, 
soldiers will submit cheerfully, and without murmuring, to any 
inconvenience: it is also the best means of securing their attention and 
confidence. 17 
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The officers and men of the Experimental Rifle Corps and its successor, the 95th , 
from 1800 to the summer of 1808, were put through their paces in constant training in the 
south of England. They also participated in several of the amphibious operations that 
characterized the British war effort against France, her allies and her client states prior to 
the beginning of the Peninsular War. Parties of riflemen served aboard Royal Navy 
vessels as marines in Nelson's spectacular raid on the Danish navy in 1801, they fought 
in Germany in 1805-1806 with the expeditionary force that evacuated the remains of the 
army of Hanover, and in South America against France's Spanish allies in the ill-fated 
Monte Video and Buenos Aires campaigns in 1806-1807. In this last campaign they 
served under the command of Brigadier Robert Craufurd, future commander of the Light 
Division. Finally, they served at Copenhagen in 1808, with Sir Arthur Wellesley, as yet a 
relatively unknown "Indian" general. During these campaigns and expeditions the 95th 
set about making a name for itself. It had slipped onto the British Army's strength 
largely through the patronage of the Duke of York and Sir John Moore, both influential 
figures in army reform, but was considered somewhat unconventional in a highly 
conservative society, little more than a curious plaything never more than temporary and 
experimental. The publicity and support that gave the Rifles the legitimacy and 
17 Ibid., 65. 
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recognition it so badly needed and much deserved came not from the Royal Army, but 
from the Royal Navy. Colonel Stewart and a detachment of riflemen served aboard 
Nelson's ships at the battle of Copenhagen and made quite an impression upon the 
Admiral who was fast becoming one of England's greatest heroes. They made such a 
mark that one-eighth of the prize money seized from the Danes was passed on to the Rifle 
Corps and Nelson and Stewart carried on a correspondence until Nelson's death at 
Trafalgar in 1805. In a letter written shortly after the engagement at Copenhagen Nelson 
made a statement that did much to ensure the continuation of the Rifles, "I hope the 
G ·11 . Rifl C "18 overnment w1 mcrease your e orps. 
The summer of 1808 found four companies of the 2nd Battalion, 95th Rifles, 
preparing to embark for Portugal as part of an expeditionary force once again 
commanded by Sir Arthur Wellesley. 
18 Bryant, Jackets of Green, 30 
Chapter 4 
Combat Operations of the Light Division during the defense of Portugal, 1810-1811. 
Before examining the role of the 95th Rifles in the campaign of 1810-1811, fought 
to secure once and for all a British foothold in the Peninsula at Lisbon and to complete 
the restructuring and training of the Portuguese Army along British lines, it is necessary 
to set down a brief history of their actions in the two years leading to this point. The 1st 
and 2nd Battalions of the 95th came to the Iberian Peninsula as part of a British 
Expeditionary Force in 1808 with the goal of disrupting Napoleon's Continental System 
and in answer to a plea for help from the Portuguese Royal family. This was Britain's 
largest overseas expedition since the American War of Independence and opened what 
Napoleon would come to call his "Spanish Ulcer." 
Four companies of the 2nd Battalion landed with Sir Arthur Wellesley's army at 
Mondego Bay on 1 August 1808. The riflemen of the 95th , along with detachments of the 
60th, formed the advanced guard as the British moved towards Lisbon and were closely 
engaged in the skirmishing at Obidos, Rolica and Vimiero. Following the Convention of 
Cintra 1 the 2nd Battalion was joined by the 1st and followed Sir John Moore, the army's 
new commander on his campaign into Spain. The purpose of this campaign was to 
support the Spanish Army and population, which was engaged in a popular uprising 
against the French. By the time Moore's army reached Salamanca Napoleon had arrived 
in Spain and crushed the bulk of the Spanish forces, placing his brother Joseph on the 
1 Tilis treaty, created by Wellesley's superiors, allowed the entire French army in Portugal, a defeated 
army, to leave in British ships with its arms. Wellesley, Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard were 
recalled to England to face a Parliamentary investigation in which Wellesley was cleared. 
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throne. Moore turned north towards Burgos in an attempt to cut Napoleon's lines of 
communication but soon found his own line of retreat threatened by other French armies 
under Marshal's Soult and Ney. On Christmas Eve1808, Sir John Moore turned his army 
back towards the west coast of Spain and the port of Corunna, to evacuate before he was 
completely cut off. 
The rear guard of the army was composed of four brigades under the command of 
Major General Edward Paget. One of these brigades, the 1st Flank Brigade, under the 
command of Brigadier General Robert Craufurd, included battalions from the three 
regiments that later comprised the Light Brigade and Light Division: 1st Battalion 43rd 
Foot, 2nd Battalion 52nd Foot and 2nd Battalion 95th Rifles. This Brigade, along with other 
elements of the army, was dispatched to Vigo, further south along the coast relieving the 
over-burdened commissariat services of Moore's army. While the rest of the army came 
close to falling apart due to the hardships of the winter retreat, the three regiments trained 
at Shorncliffe held together and maintained their moral and discipline. While much of 
this was indeed due to the fine training enforced by Manningham, Stewart and Moore, a 
new element was added to the character of the Rifles, an element that made them, along 
with the 43rd and 52nd, the finest infantry in Europe. This new force was the character of 
their commanding officer, Robert Craufurd. 
Craufurd first served with the 95th during the expedition to Buenos Aires and 
developed a rather close attachment to the green jackets. From that ill-fated 
expedition 2until his death in 1812 at the storming ofCuidad Rodrigo, he was never 
2 The poorly managed expedition to seize one of Spain's largest and most wealthy colonies ended in the 
British expeditionary force being forced to surrender following a nationalistic rising by the population. See 
Vemer's History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, vol. 1, chapter 9. 
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without at least a small detachment of rifles. Rifleman Benjamin Harris, who served with 
Craufurd in the 2nd Battalion during the Corunna campaign observed: 
It sometimes amused me to see him with the Rifles always at his heels, 
like they were his familiars. When he stopped his horse and halted to 
deliver one of his stern reprimands, you would see half a dozen lean, 
unshaven, shoeless, and savage Riflemen leaning on their weapons, 
scowling up in his face as he scolded them. And then, when he dashed his 
spurs into his reeking horse, they would throw their rifles upon their 
shoulders and hobble after him again. 3 
Craufurd was well educated and a professional military man in the modern sense. 
He took a keen interest in his military education, unlike most officers of the day. He had 
served in Parliament for several years while on leave from the army on half pay but 
returned to active service for the South American expedition. It seemed that Craufurd 
had an instinctive knack for commanding light troops and for this reason was given 
command of one of Sir John Moore's Flank Brigades during the Corunna campaign. His 
style of command, however, was very different from that adopted by Stewart and Moore. 
The system of discipline he employed still included the use of flogging for even the most 
minor of violations. This was tempered by an innate common sense in his command 
structure and in the Standing Orders he developed for the regiments under his command 
during the Peninsula War. Any light infantryman or rifleman who found himself lashed 
to the tripod being flogged had every reason to be there based on the value system of the 
era. His Standing Orders ensured that every officer and NCO in his command knew 
every duty and how to perform it with the utmost speed and accuracy, from filling out the 
mountains of paperwork the army required, to packing the baggage, posting sentries and 
how to march. This last may seem trivial, but Craufurd realized absolute discipline must 
3 Eileen Hathaway, A Dorset Rifleman, 110. 
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be maintained upon the march, especially when crossing obstacles such as streams and 
rivers. He insisted that his men march straight through, without breaking ranks to find 
their own way. While this proved uncomfortable for the men who had to march in wet 
trousers, it saved a great deal of time and spared much confusion. The whole column 
would not get bottled up at the river's edge, seeking a convenient crossing point and then 
having to be reorganized on the far bank. In the same light Craufurd insisted his officers 
share the hardships of their men. Rifleman Harris observed a humorous event on the 
retreat to Vigo involving a stream crossing and an officer attempting to spare himself wet 
clothing: 
We came to a river which was tolerably wide, but not very deep. This 
was just as well for had it been deep as the dark regions, we would have 
had to go through somehow or other, for what with the avenger behind, 
and Craufurd along with us, we were kept moving along whatever the 
obstacle. So into the stream went the light brigade, and Craufurd, busy as 
a shepherd with his flock, rode in and out of the water to keep his wearied 
band from being drowned as they crossed over. One officer, probably to 
save himself from being wet through, and having to wear damp breeches 
for the remainder of the day, had mounted the back of one of his men. 
Craufurd spied him. The sight of such effeminacy was enough to raise the 
choler of the general and he was soon plunging and splashing through the 
water after them. 
"Put him down, sir! Put him down! I desire you to put that officer 
down instantly!"" Whereupon the soldier dropped his burden into the 
stream like a hot potato and went on through. 
"Return sir," said Craufurd to the officer, "and go through the water 
like the others. I will not allow my officers to ride upon the men's backs 
through the rivers. All must take their share alike here." 
Wearied as we were, this affair caused all who saw it to almost shout 
with laughter. It was never forgotten by those who survived the retreat. 4 
Craufurd's command arrived in Vigo on 13 January 13 1809 and after several 
4 Ibid., 111-112. 
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days wait in order to gather up stragglers, embarked for England, arriving in Portsmouth 
on I February. 5 
After rest and refitting, the 2nd Battalion was sent to the Netherlands in the spring 
of 1809 as part of the Walcheren expedition where little was achieved, excepting the 
deaths and crippling of hundreds due to malarial fevers. The I st Battalion, along with the 
1st Battalions of the 43rd and 52nd Light Infantry and "A" Battery of the Royal Horse 
Artillery, were ordered back to the Peninsula under Craufurd to join the army again under 
the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley. Built around the garrison left at Lisbon by Sir 
John Moore, this army was intended to liberate Portugal and aid the Spanish Juntas. 
Initially a part of the 3rd Division, Craufurd's brigade was detached during the winter of 
1809-1810 and reconstituted as the Light Division in the spring of 1810 by the addition 
of two battalions of Portuguese cacadores (light infantry), and the 1st King's German 
Legion Hussars. 
The three British regiments remained the heart of the division, a "band of 
brothers." Indeed three very famous brothers, Charles, William and George Napier, 
served with the Light Division during the Peninsular War, each in one of the British 
regiments. Captain J.H. Cooke of the 43rd described the relationship among the three 
regiments: 
Though amongst the regiments which composed it there existed an 
unanimity which was almost without parallel in war, yet there was a shade 
of difference between them - a something peculiar to each corps 
distinguishing it from the others - which was the more remarkable as 
amongst them there was a sort of fraternal compact, and it has occurred 
that three brothers held commissions at the same time in the 43rd , 52nd and 
Rifle Corps. 
5 Ian Fletcher, Craufurd's Light Division. The Life of Robert Craufurd and His Command of the Light 
Division (funbridge Wells, Kent: Spellmount Ltd., 1991), 70. 
The 43rd were a gay set -the dandies of the Army; the great 
encouragers of dramatic performances, dinner parties and balls of which 
their headquarters was the pivot. 
The 52nd were highly gentlemanly men of a steady aspect; they mixed 
little with other corps, but attended the theatricals of the 43rd with 
circumspect good humour, and now and then relaxed, but were soon again 
the 52nd. 
The Rifle Corps were skirmishers in every sense of the word; a sort of 
wild sportsmen, and up to every description of fun and good humour. 
Nothing came amiss: the very trees responded to their merriment, and 
scraps of their sarcastic rhymes passed current through all camps and 
bivouacs. 6 
Of course Captain John Kincaid had much to say about his own regiment and 
those with whom he fought. About the 95th, "for there is none other that I like so 
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much ... for we were the light regiment of the Light Division, and fired the first and last 
shot in almost every battle, siege, and skirmish, in which the army was engaged during 
the war." 7 About his fellow light infantry regiments he wrote: 
... with regard to regiments, I beg to be understood as identifying our old 
and gallant associates, the forty-third and fifty-second, as a part of 
ourselves, for they bore their share in everything, and I love them as I 
hope to do my better half, (when I come to be divided,) wherever we were, 
they were; and although the nature of our arm generally gave us more 
employment in the way of skirmishing, yet, whenever it came to a pinch, 
independent of a suitable mixture of them among us, we had only to look 
behind to see a line, in which we might place a degree of confidence, 
almost equal to our hopes in heaven; nor were we ever disappointed. 
There never was a corps ofriflemen in the hands of such supporters! 8 
This spirit of brotherhood continued, even after the many reorganizations and 
amalgamations that have occurred in the British Army. Officers from all three regiments 
6 Quoted in Vcmcr, History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, vol. 2, 103. From A Narrative of the 
Events in the South of France, by Captain J.H. Cooke, 1835. 
7 Kincaid, Adventures in the Rifle Brigade, 16. 
8 lbid. 
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and from "A" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, remain members of the others regimental 
messes. 
Craufurd' s brigade missed the battle of Talavera, the first major battle of 
Wellesley's new campaign by only a few hours, having just completed a forced march of 
nearly fifty miles in only twenty-six hours, quite an achievement in itself. The Light 
Brigade immediately took up the outposts for the army and following the failure of 
Wellesley's Spanish allies to provide adequate food and transportation, they formed the 
rear guard of the army as it withdrew into Portugal. As both the British and French 
armies moved into winter quarters Wellesley, made Viscount Wellington on 10 January 
1810 in honor of his victory at Talavera, began to lay plans for making Portugal a fortress 
in order to guarantee Britain a stronghold on the continent. While his chief engineer, 
Colonel Fletcher, began construction of a massive series of defensive works at Torres 
Vedras, the Light Division, now detached from the 3rd Division, was positioned on the 
Portuguese/Spanish frontier. Their mission was to guard a one-hundred-mile-long 
expanse of rugged terrain between the Douro and Tagus rivers, the only acceptable route 
for a French advance. From February 1810 until Marchl811, excepting a short period in 
the fall and early winter of 1810-1811, when the British Army retired within the lines at 
Torres Vedras, the Light Division provided the outposts for the whole army and was in 
almost constant contact with the enemy. 
By the middle of the winter of 1810-1811, Napoleon had upwards of325,000 men 
in the Iberian Peninsula. Of these Wellington faced some 83,000, Marshal Andre 
Massena's "Army of Portugal," consisting of Marshal Michel Ney's VI Corps and 
Marshal Junot's VIII Corps, with Marshal Reynier's II Corps in support south of the 
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Tagus. To oppose this force Wellington placed some 25,000 men well forward on the 
frontier between the Douro and the Tagus with the Light Division straddling the frontier 
itself between the Spanish garrisoned fortress of Cuidad Rodrigo and the Portuguese held 
Almeida, along the line of the Agueda river and with their backs to the deep ravine cut by 
the fast running Coa river.9 In a dispatch from Wellington dated 4 February 1810, 
Craufurd received orders concerning his position in advance of the army: 
As my views, in the position which the army now occupy, are to take 
the offensive in case of the occurrence of certain events, I wish not to lose 
the possession of the Coa; and I am anxious therefore that you and Gen. 
Cole should maintain your position upon the river, unless you should find 
that the enemy collect a force in Castille which is so formidable as to 
manifest a serious intention of invading Portugal; in which case it is not 
my intention to maintain the line of the Coa. In this case I wish that, if 
you find it necessary, you should retire gradually to Celorico .... "10 
On the 6 January, with word that the French piquets were on the Agueda north of 
Cuidad Rodrigo, the Light Division crossed the Coa and occupied several villages 
between the two rivers. On the 17 January the Rifles moved north to the rugged land 
close to the Douro and remained there unmolested by French for three weeks. Several 
more weeks were spent in moving from village to village between the two rivers until 27 
February when opposing patrols, British Rifles and French cavalry, probably dragoons, 
collided at Barba del Puerco, on the Agueda. From this point friction between the 
outposts of the two armies increased as each side sought to penetrate the other's screen of 
• II p1quets. 
9 Ve mer, History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, vol. 2, 86. 
1° Colonel C.B. Gunvood, K.C.T.S., ed, The Dispatches of Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington 
during His Various Campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, The Low Countries, and France, vol. 
3, (London: Parker, Furvinall and Parker, 1844), 725. 
11 Ve mer, History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, vol. 2, 89-90. 
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On 28 February a second patrol of Rifles entered Barba del Puerco and sent a 
small detachment across the Agueda, determining that an all arms force of some 3,000 
Frenchmen was in the nearby village of San Felices under General Ferey. Between 28 
February and 11 March, patrols of Rifles occupied and abandoned Barba del Puerco 
several times as changes in the weather altered the level of the rivers and streams 
between the Agueda and the main body of the Light Division on the Coa. This threatened 
to cut these patrols off and affect their ability to receive reinforcement. On 11 March 
Craufurd decided to push the entire strength of the 95th forward onto the line of the 
Agueda with elements of the 43rd just to the rear to provide support. Lieutenant Colonel 
Sidney Beckwith, commander of the 1st Battalion, occupied the village with four 
companies. One of these, Captain Peter O'Hare's, was posted as a piquet above the 
ravine through which the river flowed, observing the narrow Roman bridge some eight 
hundred yards from the village. Four more companies were posted in Villar de Ciervos, 
six miles south of Barba del Puerco, watching several ford's across the Agueda, with one 
company in Escalhao twelve miles to the north and one in Almofalla six miles to the 
north. 12 With the exception of small patrols from the 1st King's German Legion Hussars, 
these ten companies of riflemen were the only obstacle between the French army and the 
bulk of the Light Division. Deserters from among the French troops, mostly Italians and 
Germans in the various foreign corps, provided a great deal of information on enemy 
movements and dispositions, building up what Wellington referred to as his 
"intelligence." While the other ranks had a rather dull time of it, marching from outpost 
to outpost, the officers were busy gathering information and adjusting their positions in 
12 Ibid., 90. 
order to maintain the integrity of the picquet line. Still, the officers maintained good 
humor as illustrated in an anecdote related by Kincaid in Random Shots: 
The chief of the 1st German hussars meeting our commandant one 
morning, "Well, Colonel," says the gallant German in broken English, 
"how do you do?" "O, tolerably well, thank you, considering that I am 
obliged to sleep with one eye open." "By Gott," says the other, "I never 
sleeps at all." 1:1 
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Having left the British to undisturbed at Barba del Puerco for eight days, General 
Ferey decided to make an attempt to capture the bridge on the night of the nineteenth, and 
thus penetrate the British piquet line. The weather that night was overcast with 
occasional heavy storms of rain, the river swollen and splashing noisily over its rocky 
bed. Ferey selected six companies ofvoltiguers from his brigade to spearhead his assault, 
with another 1,500 men in close reserve. Taking advantage of the stormy weather, the 
French light troops closed upon the bridge. 
The piquet on the bridge consisted of Captain O'Hare's company. Two men were 
placed almost on the bridge itself with orders to give the alarm if attacked and fall back to 
the sergeant's party posted some fifty yards above the bridge. This group consisted of a 
sergeant and twelve men. Their orders were to delay any enemy advance at all cost until 
assistance arrived. The remainder of the company was quartered in a small church at the 
edge of the village. At about 9:00 p.m. Captain O'Hare took ill and retired to bed, 
leaving the piquet in the hands of his Subalterns, Lieutenants Mercer and Cowan and 2nd 
L. G s· 14 1eutenant eorge 1mmons. 
It is especially fortunate that so many of the Rifles diarists seemed to be in this 
13 Kincaid, Random Shots from a Rifleman, 51. 
14 Verner, History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, vol. 2, 93. 
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company. Second Lieutenant Simmons, Sergeant Edward Costello, and Bugler William 
Green were all present during this action. The warning was given as the French crossed 
the bridge and overwhelmed the two man piquet, one of whom managed to fire a shot 
before being captured. The sergeant's party immediately grabbed their weapons and 
opened fire on the advancing voltiguers. Sergeant Betts in command of the outpost was 
shot through the mouth and killed, his small detachment quickly forced to withdraw. 
Their volley, however, had bought enough time for the rest of O'Hare's company to 
scramble out of their quarters and into the rocks above the ravine: 
My surprise soon, however, gave place to perfect recollection, and in 
less than a minute we were all under arms, the balls of the French 
whistling about us as a column came rushing over the bridge to force our 
position. Captain O'Hare, with his characteristic coolness, immediately 
gave us the word to 'seek cover', and we threw ourselves forward among 
the rocky and broken ground, from whence we kept up a galling fire upon 
those who had commenced storming our heights. 15 
Second Lieutenant Simmons quickly found himself in command of the forward 
elements of the piquet when Lieutenant Mercer who was with him was shot through the 
head while putting on his spectacles and fell dead at his feet. O'Hare had not yet arrived, 
Lieutenant Cowan having been sent to fetch him, and for some fifteen minutes the 
struggle was in the hands of a young Second Lieutenant. To his credit Simmons 
immediately took charge of the situation: 
In a moment, after the arrival of the main body of the piquet, the 
French were literally scrambling up the rocky ground within ten yards of 
us. We commenced firing at each other very spiritedly. Their drums beat 
a charge, and the French attempted to dislodge us without effect. My 
friend, Lieutenant Mercer, who was putting on his spectacles, received a 
musket ball through his head, and fell dead close by my feet. Several were 
now falling, and the moon for a few minutes shone brightly, then 
disappeared, and again at intervals let us see each other. We profited by 
15 Anthony Brett-James, ed., Edward Costello: The Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns, 26. 
this circumstance, as their belts were white and over their greatcoats, so 
that where they crossed upon the breast, combined with the glare of the 
breast-plate, gave a grand mark for our rifles. Our men being in dark 
dresses, and, from their small number, obliged to keep close together, the 
ground also being exceedingly rugged, were all favourable circumstances. 
We fought in this way for at least half an hour against fearful odds, when 
Lieutenant-Colonel Beckwith brought up the three reserve companies 
from the village, who soon decided the affair. 16 
Bugler Green also remembered the closeness and ferocity of the fight before Beckwith 
arrived with the reinforcements, as he was attacked: 
Three of these big ugly fellows came within me and my front rank 
man. I had got my ball in my rifle, but had not time to return my ramrod, 
so both ball and ramrod went through one of them. My comrade fired, and 
the ball struck another in the breast. I threw my rifle down, as it was no 
use to me without a ramrod, and retired about 20 yards. 17 
Green found another weapon and continued the fight. 
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As stated by Simmons, the arrival of Beckwith and the remaining three companies 
from Barba del Puerco decided the fight. Many of these riflemen, hastily pulled from 
bed, were dressed only in their trousers and shirts. Beckwith personally led the counter -
attack in a nightgown, slippers and red nightcap. 18 While his riflemen fired a devastating 
volley, Beckwith observed a French soldier taking aim at him within a couple of yards: 
Stooping suddenly down and picking up a stone, he immediately shyed 
it at him, calling him at the same time a "scoundrel, to get out at that." It 
so far distracted the fellow's attention that while the gallant Beckwith' s 
cap was blown to atoms, the head remained untouched. 19 
16 Willoughby Verner, Lieutenant-Colonel, ed., Major George Simmons: A British Rifleman. Journals 
d Correspondance during the Peninsular War and the Campaigns of Wellington. With and introduction 
~; Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby Verner (London: A&C Black, 1899. Reprint, London: Greenhill 
Books, 1986), 53-54. . . 
11 Quoted in Fletcher, Craufurd's Light Division, 98. From Travels and Adventures by Bugler William 
Green, 1857. 
1s Ibid., 99. 
19 Kincaid, Random Shots from a Rifleman, 55. 
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This was not Beckwith's only close call in the closing minutes of the struggle. Moments 
later a voltigeur, a mere boy, fired his musket into Beckwith's face. Fortunately the 
weapon misfired. A rifleman was about to kill the boy when the Lieutenant-Colonel 
stopped him saying, "Let him alone; I daresay the boy has a mother. Knock the thing out 
of his hand, that he may do no more mischief with it, and give him a kick on the bottom 
and send him to the rear."20 
The French, repulsed by the accurate fire of the riflemen retired back across the 
bridge. They left two officers and twelve other ranks dead, five mortally wounded and 
upwards of thirty more wounded carried back with their comrades. O'Hare's under 
strength company, which numbered only fifty-three men before the fight, lost one officer 
and five men killed, with seven seriously wounded. The reserve companies had two men 
killed and eight wounded. Just under four hundred men, less then two hundred actually 
engaged, repulsed an attack by six hundred of the enemy's finest. Craufurd was rightly 
pleased and issued the following General Order to his Division: 
Brigadier-General Craufurd has it in command from the Commander-
in-Chief to assure Lieutenant-Colonel Beckwith and the officers of the 
95th Regiment who were engaged at Barba del Puerco that their conduct in 
this affair has augmented the confidence he has in the troops when 
opposed to the enemy in any situation. 
Brigadier-General Craufurd feels peculiar satisfaction in noticing the 
first affair in which any part of the Light Brigade were engaged during the 
present campaign. 
That British troops should defeat a superior number of the enemy is 
nothing new; but the action reflects honour on Lietenant-Colonel 
Beckwith and the Regiment inasmuch as it was of a sort which the 
riflemen of other armies would shun. In other armies the rifle is 
considered ill-calculated for close action with an enemy armed with a 
musket and bayonet; but the 95th Regiment has proved that the rifle in the 
hands of a British soldier is a fully sufficient weapon to enable him to 
20 Verner, ed., A British Rifleman, 54. 
defeat the French in the closest fight in whatever manner they may be 
armed.21 
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The outpost at Barba del Puerco was soon augmented by a company of the 43rd 
and two from the 52nd and the whole was withdrawn to Villar de Ciervos. The attack on 
Barba del Puerco was the first and last time the French ever attempted to surprise a 
British outpost during the Peninsular War.22 
Following the withdrawal from Barba del Puerco, things once again settled down 
along the line of the Agueda and the Coa. The 1st King's German Legion Hussars were 
joined by squadrons of the 14th and 16th Light Dragoons, while two companies of the 1st 
Battalion, 95th were effectively disbanded, the men being dispersed among the remaining 
eight companies, the officers and NCOs returning to England to recruit. The Light 
Division was kept busy patrolling and garrisoning the scattered villages between the 
fortresses of Cuidad Rodrigo and Almeida, observing the movements of the growing 
French "Army of Portugal" under Massena as they prepared to lay siege to Cuidad 
Rodrigo. Costello noted the routine of outposts and observation: 
A section of our rifles usually mounted piquet with a troop of dragoons, 
and occupied, accordingly, three different points - Carpio, Molina dos 
Flores and Marialva; all all about two miles nearer to Rodrigo. Bull's 
troop of artillery [ actually Ross' s] remained always near a church, in the 
center of the village of Gallegos, and at all times kept a gun ready loaded 
with blank cartridge, and a sentry near it, watching a beacon erected on a 
hill, about a mile from the village. A vidette and one of our riflemen were 
placed near the beacon in case of the piquets being attacked, to give alarm 
by discharging his piece into the combustibles, and so setting it on fire; or, 
in the case of its not igniting, to ride round it three times, with his cap 
mounted on his sword, at which signal the gun was instantly fired, and the 
whole division were immediately under arms.23 
;:1 Quoted in Verner, History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, vol. 2, 97. 
22 This fact is mentioned by both Kincaid and Costello in their memoires. 
23 Brett-James, Edward Costello: The Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns, 28. 
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On 26 April the French invested the Fortress ofCuidad Rodrigo, but 
communication was kept open with the Light Division until 5 June when Ney crossed the 
Agueda and pushed back the advanced videttes of the 1st Hussars. French siege guns 
began bombarding the fortress on 25 June. On 4 July Massena sent 15,000 men to force 
Craufurd back from his position at Gallegos, approximately half way between Cuidad 
Rodrigo and Almeida. The French force, infantry and dragoons under Junot, induced 
Craufurd to withdraw simply through weight of numbers, pushing him back across the 
Dos Casas river. The 1st Hussars covered the withdrawal in good order, fighting for 
every inch yielded. The 95th, along with some of the Hussars, shielded the river crossing 
with a steady fire, using the advantage of their weapons' range to keep the French back 
until all of the division was over the river. The fire was so effective that Junot refused to 
maintain pressure on the retiring Light Division, believing it had much greater numbers 
than it actually did. 
Craufurd re-established his outposts around the village of Val de la Mula with two 
hundred riflemen and some cavalry positioned on the heights near the abandoned Fort 
Conception. On 10 July, Cuidad Rodrigo fell to the French whose entire army crossed 
the Agueda. Pressure was growing on Craufurd. On 11 July he launched a badly 
managed cavalry attack against a strong French patrol in which the commander of the 
14th Light Dragoons, Colonel Talbot, was killed. Wellington began to urge Craufurd not 
to risk his force, on the thirteenth he sent a dispatch instructing Craufurd to fall back on 
General Picton's 3rd Division if pushed by an overwhelming French force. Wellington 
again stressed on the sixteenth that Craufurd should not risk his force beyond the Coa: 
It is desirable that we should hold the other side of the Coa a little 
longer; and I don't think that our doing so is facilitated by our keeping La 
Conception. At the same time I don't want you to risk anything to remain 
at the other side of the river, or to retain the fort; and I am anxious that, 
when you leave it, it should be destroyed. 24 
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Immediately upon receiving this order Craufurd withdrew his command to the banks of 
the Coa, excepting the Cavalry which remained around Fort Conception to cover a party 
of engineers preparing to demolish the works. This was accomplished on the morning of 
the twenty-first, the fort's walls being breached from within in the face of advancing 
French dragoons and hussars. 
Craufurd was now left to determine if the French advance was simply a 
reconnaissance in force or an actual move to invest the fortress of Almeida. Pressure 
from the French and from Wellington continued to mount. On the twenty-second 
Craufurd received another dispatch from Wellington: 
I have ordered 2 battalions to support your flanks (from the 3rd Division); 
but I am not desirous of engaging in an affair beyond the Coa. Under 
these circumstances, if you are not covered from the sun where you are, 
would it not be better that you should come to this side with your infantry 
at least?25 
How was Craufurd to take this, as a direct order or as a suggestion? Through the 
remainder of the twenty-second and the twenty-third he stayed in place as patrols brought 
word of the approach of increasing numbers of French troops of all arms. 
Sergeant Costello recalled the ever-increasing pressure of the French advance and 
the preparations made by the Rifles: 
We now daily held ourselves in expectation of an attack, and were 
under arms every morning at one o'clock, five minutes only being allowed 
for the whole division to fall in. But we seldom took our accoutrements 
24 Colonel C.B. Gurwood, K.C.T.S., ed., The Dispatches of Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington, vol. 
4, 172. 
25 Ibid., 179. 
off, and used to sleep and cook with them on. The baggage was paraded 
every morning half a mile to the rear, and every other precaution taken by 
the Brigadier for an orderly retreat, as the French were in our front and in 
overwhelming force, while our division was scarcely more that four 
thousand strong.26 
Craufurd seemed unwilling to abandon his post in the face of the enemy. Even his 
cavalry, which was far too few in number to prove of any real use against their French 
opponents was maintained on the east bank of the Coa. 
The night of23 July brought a violent storm which soaked the troops of both 
sides, exposed as they were in the fields around Almeida. Simmons spent a very 
uncomfortable night, "upon a stone like a drowned rat, looking at the heavens and 
amusing myself with their brilliancy .... "27 The rain blew out by dawn, leaving the 
riflemen to dry both their clothing and ammunition. The French wasted no time in 
beginning their advance: 
At break of day, the music that we were now getting quite accustomed 
to - ie, the cracking of the rifles of our outline picquet, gave intelligence 
of the enemy's advance. Our company was immediately ordered to 
support them. Captain O'Hare accordingly placed us behind some 
dilapidated walls; we waited the approach of the picquet then under the 
Hon. Captain Stewart engaged about half a mile in our front, and slowly 
retreating upon us. They had already, as it afterwards appeared, several 
men killed, while Lieutenant M'Cullock had been wounded and taken 
prisoner with a number of others. We could distinctly see the enemy's 
columns in great force, but had little time for observations, as our advance 
ran in upon us followed by the French tirailleurs, with whom we were 
speedily and hotly engaged .... 28 
26 Brett-James, Edward Costello: The Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns, 29-30. 
27 Verner, ed, A British Rifleman, 76. 
28 Brett-James, Edward Costello: The Peninsular and Waterloo Campaign. 32. 
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The position Craufurd's command occupied before Almeida was precarious 
indeed. In his History of the British Army, Fortescue with an eye for terrain gave a 
splendid description of the field of battle: 
The ridge upon which Almeida stands forms the western boundary of 
the great upraised plain of Leon, the altitude of the town above the sea 
exceeding two thousand feet. The summit is broad, flat, and sound, an 
ideal country for cavalry, and to the eastward the upland rolls away in 
broad billows which are furrowed by little rapid streams. But on the 
westward side of the fortress the ground plunges down rapidly to the gorge 
of the Coa; the distance from the walls to the river in a direct line being 
almost three thousand yards, and the difference in height over three 
hundred feet. The whole of this hillside is seamed by hollows, about three 
in every mile of ground, each carrying its trickle of water to the sea. From 
the southern face of the fortification there descends to the Coa a road, 
narrow and fairly steep indeed, but by no means bad, being for the most 
part paved and enclosed between fairly high stone walls. It would, 
however, be too slippery for horses to descend it safely at high speed, 
particularly after rain. This road follows a leading spur very nearly to its 
foot; and the final descent to the bridge, upon which Craufurd's salvation 
depended, is a comparatively easy slope. The ridges immediately to right 
and left of the leading spur both tend to converge upon the bridge. The 
ground along the upper part of the declivity is broken by countless 
vineyards, high walls, and little enclosures, but the soil steadily becomes 
poorer as the water is approached. The rock crops up more and more 
thickly through the heather and broom, the enclosures become less 
frequent, and for the last few hundred yards the ground is open and the 
rock is everywhere. At a short distance from the water the road for 
wheeled traffic is forced aside by many obstacles, and after turning for a 
little way upstream, doubles back to its final access to the bridge. But for 
men and pack animals the track leads perfectly straight down, and upon 
each flank of this final descent to the bridge rise two rocky knolls, covered 
with heather and broom. The Coa itself is a boiling torrent which, at the 
point where the road touched it, has cleft its way through the rock and 
turned the valley into a chasm. The bridge consists of two lofty arches, 
and the roadway runs nearly forty feet above the highest flood mark. The 
left or western bank offers above the bridge a fairly easy slope, which 
becomes far steeper below; immediately opposite the bridge itself it 
presents a sheer cliff over one hundred feet high. 29 
29 Fortescue, A History of the British Army, vol. 7, 476-477. 
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This terrain offered little advantage to the guns and cavalry on either side. The 
developing battle was to be an affair for light infantry with little exception. On the 
extreme left of Craufurd' s line was an old stone windmill garrisoned by a half company 
of the 52nd. To the right of this was the 43rd, the 1st and 3rd Cacadores in the center and 
the remainder of the 52nd on the right. The riflemen were distributed along the line and 
up to several hundred yards in advance. His guns and cavalry, along with the baggage, 
more of a burden than help in the close, broken terrain was formed up on the road to 
cross the bridge. After pushing in Captain Stewart's piquet company on the Val de la 
Mula road, the French paused for over two hours, apparently in order to form up for 
battle and bring up their entire force. Still, in the face of overwhelming odds, Craufurd 
refused to withdraw. 
74 
With preparations complete the French again advanced, Loison's division in front, 
Mermet's in support, both of Marshal Ney's 6th Corps. They approached rapidly and 
with much spirit, the massed drummers beating the pas de charge from the head of the 
dense columns, "in front of the line French officers, like mountebanks running forward 
and placing their hats on their swords and capering about like madmen, saying as they 
turned to their men 'Come on children of our Country. The first that advances, Napoleon 
will recompense him. "' 30 At this point disaster almost overtook O'Hare's Company on 
the extreme left of the British line some one hundred yards in advance of the 43rd -
Portuguese gunners on the walls of the fortress, mistaking the darkly clothed riflemen as 
French advancing on the scarlet-coated 43rd, fired several shots which fell among them, 
killing and wounding several. O'Hare gave the order to retire by half-companies; one 
30 Verner, ed, A British Rifleman, 77. 
platoon falling back while the other covered. At this moment a squadron of the elite 
French 3rd Hussars swept along the flank of the British line and into the riflemen. 
Simmons was among this group of rifles: 
... a body of Hussars in bearskin caps and light-coloured pelisses got 
amongst the few remaining Rifle Men and began to sabre them. Several 
attempted to cut me down, but I avoided their kind intentions by stepping 
to one side .... A volley was now fired by a party of the 43rd under 
Captain Wells, which brought several of the Hussars to the ground. In the 
scuffie I took to my heels and ran to the 43rd, Wells calling out, "Mind the 
Rifle Man! Do not hit him, for heaven's sake." As I was compelled to run 
into their fire to escape, he seized me by the hand and was delighted 
beyond measure at my escape31 
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With his left flank effectively turned by the French hussars and heavy columns of 
infantry advancing from the front, Craufurd' s already precarious position was growing 
more and more tenuous. He ordered the cavalry and guns down the road to cross the 
bridge, with the cacadores following down the rocky slope while the British regiments 
made a rear-guard fight. The Portuguese infantry, moving faster down the slope than the 
horses and vehicles of the cavalry and artillery, swept onto the narrow road and became 
completely intermingled with them. As if this were not enough, a wagon overturned in 
the road, blocking it entirely for quite some time until it was righted. At this point 
Craufurd seems to have lost all control over the battle. Rather than a coordinated 
withdrawal of a division in the face of the enemy, the battle fell into the hands of 
individual regimental and company officers. The Company System devised by Stewart 
and implemented by Moore was now about to be tested in the heat ofbattle. 32 
The riflemen, fighting in small parties of sections and platoons fought their way 
31 Ibid., 77-78. 
32 For a general description of the action see Vemer's, History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, vol. 
2, chapter 7 and Fletcher's, Craufurd's light Division, chapter 3, "The Darkest Day." 
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slowly back down the hill towards the bridge over the Coa, defending each and every 
wall and enclosure. Behind them stood the 43rd and 52nd, their closed ranks and rapid 
volleys of musketry holding the advancing French at bay if they got too close, buying the 
riflemen time to fall back upon another strong position. Four or five companies of the 
43rd found themselves trapped in a stone walled enclosure at one point. The officers and 
men, working in a concerted effort, succeeded in literally pushing the wall over and 
rejoined the action. 
Being members of O'Hare's company, on the most exposed flank of the British 
line, Sergeant Costello and Lieutenant Simmons experienced some of the heaviest 
fighting of the day, both were wounded severely. As the company retired it was ridden 
over several times by French dragoons and hussars, Costello's received his wound while 
falling back upon the 52nd : 
I rushed up to the wall of our 52nd, which I was in the act of clearing at a 
jump, when I received a shot under the cap of my right knee and instantly 
fell. In this emergency, there seemed a speedy prospect of my again 
falling into the hands of the French, as the division was in rapid retreat, 
but a comrade of the name of Little instantly dragged me over the wall, 
and was proceeding as quick as possible with me, on his back, towards the 
bridge of the Coa, over which our men were fast pouring, when he, poor 
fellow! also received a shot, which passing through his arm smashed the 
bone, and finally lodged itself in my thigh, where it has ever since 
remained. In this extremity, Little was obliged to abandon me, but urged 
by a strong desire to escape imprisonment, I made another desperate 
effort, and managed to get over the bridge .... 33 
Simmons was wounded in the final struggle to hold the bridge as the last of the rearguard 
crossed: 
... I was shot through the thigh close to the wall, which caused me to 
fall with great force. Being wounded in this way was quite a new thing to 
me. For a few moments I could not collect my ideas, and was feeling 
33 Brett-James, Edward Costello: The Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns, 33-34. 
about my arms and body for a wound, until my eye caught the stream of 
blood rushing through the hole in my trousers, and my leg and thigh 
appeared so heavy that I could not move it. Captain Napier took off his 
neckerchief and gave it to a sergeant, who put it round my thigh and 
twisted it tight with a ramrod, to stop the bleeding. The firing was so 
severe that the sergeant, on finishing the job for me, fell with a shot 
through the head. Captain Napier was also about the same time wounded 
. h .d 34 mt e s1 e. 
77 
Several company's of the 43rd and 95th held the sandy and rocky knolls that 
flanked the road just above where it crossed the bridge until the road was cleared and the 
division had retired across it. Ross's troop of Horse Artillery was established on the far 
shore and had begun to fire across into the advancing French, who by this time had 
several of their own cannon in action. The cacadores were also in position on the west 
bank, scattered among the rocks. Here Craufurd inexplicably made another error, 
ordering the 43rd and 95th to withdraw across the bridge before a wing of the 52nd , 
fighting along the chasm edge, had crossed. Following Craufurd's orders the company's 
withdrew from the knolls and walls they had been holding and began to dash across the 
bridge, threatening to leave about half of the 52nd trapped on the east bank of the Coa. 
Lieutenant Colonel Beckwith, on his own initiative, ordered the men around him, a 
mixture of riflemen and scarlet coated light infantrymen, to retake the hill. A Major 
M'Leod of the 43rd joined him. Putting themselves at the fore of some two hundred rifles 
and light infantrymen, they stormed back up over the rocks and walls, checking the 
French advance and allowing the 52nd to cross to safety behind them. A last artillery 
vehicle, an ammunition caisson was still caught on the bridge and more riflemen lined the 
parapets, holding off the French until it was free. All of the Light Division was now on 
34 Verner, ed,A British Rifleman, 78-79. 
the west bank of the Coa except the half company of the 52nd which had been posted in 
the windmill. Surrounded by French dragoons and hussars this small force remained 
silent, managing to slip away under cover of darkness. 
The tide of battle now turned in favor of the British as Ney, not content to have 
simply given the Light Division a firm thrashing, decided to attempt to force the bridge. 
The Rifles and cacadores where well sited among the rocks and walls of the far bank, 
one company of Rifles holding an abandoned house, while the cavalry was sent to 
observe the fords six mile to the south. 
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Ney ordered the 66th Regiment de Ligne, the lead regiment of Loison' s division to 
storm the bridge, led by its Grenadiers. They made it across the bridge but were cut 
down on the British side. Next an elite storming party of chasseurs attempted to force 
the bridge. In less then ten minutes this assault attempt suffered four officers and eighty-
six men killed, and three officers and one hundred-forty-four men wounded, with bodies 
stacked as high as the parapets. The 66th again attacked losing its colonel and fifteen of 
its other officers. 35 The fight continued sporadically throughout the day, a slow rain 
causing many of the flintlock weapons to misfire as it turned the powder in the priming 
pans into a gray sludge. At sunset a French medical officer advanced waving a white 
handkerchief and asked for a cease-fire to gather up the wounded. This was granted. 
French losses for the Combat of the Coa were seven officers and one hundred and ten 
men killed, seventeen officers and three hundred and ninety-three men wounded. Four 
fifths of their casualties were incurred at the bridge. The Light Division lost four officers 
35 Verner, History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, vol. 2, 126 
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and thirty-two men killed, twenty-three officers and one hundred and ninety-one men 
wounded with one officer and eighty-two men missing, in fact captured by the French. 36 
While the officers and men of the Light Division were highly praised by 
Wellington, their commander, Craufurd was open to a great deal ofrebuke. Still, 
Wellington never openly blamed him for the rather dismal outcome of an unnecessary 
fight, stating in his dispatches on 31 July: 
Although I shall be hanged for them, you may be very certain that not 
only I have had nothing to do with, but have positively forbidden, the 
foolish affairs in which Craufurd involved his outposts. Of the first, 
indeed, in which Talbot was killed, I knew nothing before it happened. In 
respect to the last, that of the 24th, I had positively desired him not to 
engage in any affair on the other side of the Coa; ... You may say, if this 
be the case, why not accuse Craufurd? I answer, because, ifl amt be 
hanged for it, I cannot accuse a man I think has meant well, and whose 
error is one of judgement, and not of intention. 37 
The Light Division held its position on the Coa until midnight on 25 July before 
retiring in a heavy rainstorm to Freixada. They rested here until the twenty-eighth when 
they moved back to Celorico. Here, on 4 August the Division was broken into two 
brigades, the first under Sidney Beckwith comprising the 43rd, four company's of the 1st 
Battalion 95th and the 3rd Cacadores. The second brigade consisted of the 52nd, the 
remaining four companies of the 1st Battalion 95th and the 1st Cacadores, commanded by 
Lieutenant Colonel Barclay of the 52nd. Following a week's rest, the division advanced 
to support the cavalry observing the line of the Coa and attempting to maintain 
communication with the Portuguese garrison of Almeida. At the end of the first day of 
bombardment of the fortress, 26 August, a lucky shell ignited the magazine, destroying 
36 Ibid., 126-127. 
37 Quoted in Verner, History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, vol. 2, 132. From Wellington's 
Supplemental Dispatches, edited by Gurwood, 1844. 
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all of the defender's powder and dismounting many of their guns. The fortress, now 
untenable, surrendered on the following day. Wellington, who had been counting on the 
siege to give him at least a month to complete his preparations for the defense of 
Portugal, now expected Massena to advance rapidly on Lisbon. 
Wellington slowly withdrew his small army south and west, away from the line of 
the Coa, with the Light Division and cavalry disputing every water course and pass in a 
brilliant series of rear-guard fights. Craufurd seemed to have recovered completely from 
his uncertainty of24 July. The morning of22 September found Wellington preparing to 
defend the steep, long ridge of the Bussaco massif, hoping to bloody Massena' s nose in a 
sharp defensive engagement and buy time to complete his withdrawal into the lines of 
Torres Vedras. As the bulk of the British Army moved into position along the ridge the 
Light Division maintained a line of outposts and skirmishers in advance of the position, 
Craufurd displaying once again his almost complete unwillingness to withdraw in the 
face of the enemy. This time Lord Wellington intervened directly, ordering Craufurd to 
retire to the villages of Sula and Moura at the foot of the ridge before the division became 
decisively engaged and unable to withdraw.38 
By the afternoon of the twenty-fifth the bulk of the Light Division was atop the 
ridge, only the eight companies of the 95th and some cacadores remained in the villages 
and on the forward slope of the ridge. Wellington was utilizing what was to become his 
classic deployment on a defensive position. The bulk of his force was drawn up on the 
reverse slope of the ridge, out of sight of the enemy. Here they would be protected from 
cannon fire and the enemy could only guess at where the strong and weak points of the 
38 Ibid., 138-139. 
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line were. Wellington also took advantage of a track running parallel with the crest line 
to speedily move about reinforcements. The French bivouacked that night on several 
smaller spurs and ridges in front of Bussaco, their line of piquets deployed almost at the 
foot of the British position. This time it was Reynier' s Corps that would lead the attack. 
Junot's and Ney's Corps moved up on the twenty-sixth while Massena made a 
reconnaissance of the ridge, determining to attack on the following day. A French force 
of 53,000 now faced 40,000 British and Portuguese troops.39 Throughout the twenty-
sixth the riflemen holding the village of Sula underwent a heavy cannonade and several 
attacks by skirmishers as the French attempted to gain possession of the village that 
occupied a dangerous position on their right flank. The riflemen held out throughout the 
day with little loss but retired during the night as it appeared the main effort of the French 
advance would come closer to the center of the British line. 
The 95th played their usual role in a fixed defensive battle, forming a loose 
skirmish chain before the main line of the British Army concealed among the rocks of the 
steep slope. As the French columns advanced the rifles became involved in a running 
fight with their voltigeurs who greatly outnumbered them. As the French advanced 
within range of the British muskets, the riflemen fell back behind the line infantry which 
sent the French reeling back down the ridge with their controlled volleys of musketry and 
short rushes with the bayonet. Other groups of riflemen and cacadores wrapped around 
the flanks of the advancing columns and poured in a destructive fire. In lulls between the 
French advances the riflemen were busy suppressing the fire of the enemy skirmishers 
that still swarmed in the valley between the opposing camps. The day ended with the 
39 Ibid., 141. 
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French withdrawing and making a wide flank march around the British the following 
morning. Wellington for his part withdrew directly back towards Lisbon having 
sufficiently delayed the French. The Light Division suffered few casualties during the 
battle, most of which were incurred before it had properly commenced, in the fighting 
around the villages. Twenty-four men were killed and six officers and one hundred forty-
six men wounded. The 95th had only nine men killed and thirty-two wounded. 40 
The pursuit continued until 11 October when advanced French cavalry patrols 
found themselves faced with a strong line of field works and redoubts stretching across 
the peninsula upon which Lisbon is located, from the Atlantic to the Tagus. Within these 
fortifications, completed in secret by Wellington's engineers and Portuguese levee's, the 
British Army waited out the last of fall and the early winter of 1810, wondering if 
Massena's "Army of Portugal" would attack or withdraw. In order to make life more 
difficult for the French Army, accustomed to living off of the land and with limited 
supply services, Wellington adopted a scorched earth policy, bringing all civilians within 
the fortifications from miles around, along with whatever portable supplies and livestock 
they owned. All stores of food and other necessities not brought within the lines were 
hidden or destroyed. 
The Light Division never entered the Lines of Torres Vedras, they occupied 
instead a series of outposts just outside the fortifications. The riflemen of the 95th 
immediately made themselves comfortable in their new surroundings, a series of heights 
above the deserted village of Arruda. John Kincaid, recently arrived from England and a 
member of O'Hare's company made several observations of the manner in which his 
4° For a detailed account of the battle see Verner, History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, vol 2, 
chapter 8 and Fletcher, Craufurd's Light Division, chapter 4, "Moore's Avengers." 
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company lived while covering the lines. In warm or rainy weather the men were moved 
into the village itself during the day to keep out of the elements, at night they occupied 
outposts along the heights. He recorded the items the officers removed from the village 
to the bivouac site in order to make life more comfortable: 
... it was rather amusing to observe the different notions of individual 
comfort, in the selection of furniture, which officers transferred from their 
town house to their no house on the heights. A sofa, or a mattress, one 
would have thought most likely to be put in requisition; but it was not 
unusual to see a full-length looking-glass preferred to either.41 
Kincaid also found it somewhat astonishing that Massena, with his vast army, never 
made a serious effort to assault the lines at any point, stating: 
... I do know, that we have since kicked the French out of more 
formidable looking and stronger places; and, with all due deference be it 
spoken, I think that the Prince of Essling ought to have tried his luck 
against them, as he could only have been beaten by fighting, as he 
afterwards was without it! And if he thinks that he would have lost as 
many men by trying, as he did by not trying, he must allow me to differ in 
opinion with him. 42 
Finally, on IO November, with his army literally starving around him, Massena 
ordered a retreat to Santarem. This brought him closer to the lines of communication 
with France, allowing him to re-supply and recover. The army's tail, the small transport 
columns and the sick and wounded marched on the thirteenth, the combat arms slipping 
away under cover of darkness on the fourteenth, leaving straw dummies in the place of 
their sentries and their camp fires burning to fool the British piquets. This they managed 
to do until the middle of the fifteenth, Kincaid noting that, "they seemed such respectable 
representatives of their spectral predecessors, that, in the haze of the following morning, 
41 Kincaid, Adventure in the Rifle Brigade, 27. 
42 Ibid., 26-27. 
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we thought that they had been joined by some well-fed ones from the rear. ... "43 Late in 
the day three divisions of Wellington's army, including the Light Division, were in 
pursuit. On the sixteenth the Light Division caught up with the French army at Cartaxo 
and Craufurd came close to launching his solitary command against the entirety of 
Junot's Corps with only a single troop of Horse Artillery and one squadron of cavalry in 
support. Wellington was able to intervene again and halt the attack. The division 
remained in the village overnight. It seemed that Craufurd was displaying his inability to 
command a division sized force in a general engagement once again. This by no means 
lessened his credibility and talent as a commander oflight troops in outpost duties and 
the skirmish line, his talents simply did not include the ability to command in large scale 
actions. Fortunately, Wellington recognized the direction in which Craufurd's ability lay 
and was able to utilize his talent while curbing his tendency to get himself into trouble. 
Through the end of November and into December, Massena' s Army of Portugal 
gradually retired towards Spain once again nearing the line of the Coa in its steep chasm. 
The Rifles had their hands full throughout this period with skirmishing and piquet duties 
as the British Army advanced. On 30 December the Light Division entered cantonments 
on the Rio Mayor to sit out the worst of the winter before pushing on to complete the 
expulsion of the French from Portugal. 
On 6 March, 1811, a Portuguese peasant entered the camp of the Light Division 
with news that the French Army was in full retreat. Within an hour the whole force was 
on the move, with O'Hare's company in the lead. For three days Craufurd led his 
division in close pursuit of the enemy, the riflemen sometimes riding on the back of 
43 Ibid., 29. 
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dragoon horses to increase their speed and mobility while hanging on to the enemy's rear 
guard. On 9 March command of the Light Division temporarily fell to Sir William 
Erskine, as Craufurd went home on a leave of absence. His reasons seem to be an effort 
to escape the ongoing war of words against him within the Army and simply because of 
his own egoism and obstinacy which placed his personal wishes above all other concerns. 
It would be under Erskine's command that the Light Division would return to its old 
stomping grounds between the Coa and the Agueda and complete their role in the defense 
of Portugal. 
The advance continued with sharp rearguard actions fought by the French at 
Pombal, Redinha, Condeixa, Casal Novo and Faz D' Arouce from the tenth through the 
fifteenth. A General Army Order signed on the sixteenth of March praised the Light 
Division for their bravery in the difficult conditions of constant movement and fighting: 
No. I. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to the General 
and Staff Officers and Troops for their excellent conduct in the operations 
in the last ten days against the enemy. He requests the Commanding 
officers of the 43rd, 52nd and 95th Regiments to name a Sergeant in each 
Regiment to be recommended for a promotion to an Ensigncy, as a 
testimony of the particular approbation of the Commander of the Forces of 
these three Regiments.44 
The proof that the brunt of the fighting in this period was borne by the Light Division, is 
found in the casualty returns for the period. Of the twenty-eight British and Portuguese 
officers killed or wounded during the pursuit, nineteen belonged to the Light Division. 45 
The pursuit brought the Light Division back to the Coa on 1 April, this time at 
Quintas de San Bartolemeo opposite Sabugal, south of Almeida. Here Wellington 
44 Quoted in Verner, History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, vol. 2, 242. From Wellington's 
Supplemental Dispatches, edited by Gurwood, 1844, vol. 7, 82. 
45 Ibid., 247. 
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planned to smash Reynier's Corps, which occupied Sabugal, using the 3rd and 5th 
Divisions to attack him frontally, the Light Division turning his left flank and cutting off 
the French retreat. 
The attack commenced on the morning of the third, covered by a heavy fog. 
From the beginning things fell apart and only the swift and courageous action of Colonel 
Beckwith and the company commanders of his brigade prevented a disaster. The fog 
was so heavy that the commanders of the 3rd and 5th Divisions decided to await further 
orders before advancing. Erskine, in command of the Light Division, had no doubts and 
sent his force forward. In the fog and rain both of the Brigades and the supporting 
cavalry with which Erskine was posted, lost their way and began crossing the Coa. 
Beckwith' s 1st Brigade led the advance with skirmishing riflemen thrown well 
forward of the 43rd . They waded across the Coa, up to their armpits in icy water, 
receiving several shots from the French piquets before they retired. The riflemen inclined 
to their left to follow the French and stumbled directly into an entire regiment. Beckwith 
quickly realized he had marched directly into the front ofReynier's Corps rather than the 
flank. The rifles hastily withdrew, waiting until the 43rd came up in support before 
advancing again. Other French regiments were soon observed moving up through the 
mist. A Captain Hopkins of the 43rd, commanding one of the Flank Companies took the 
initiative to seize a key knoll in advance of the British position and held it against 
repeated French charges, buying time while Beckwith consolidated his position. A brief 
respite in the mist and drizzle revealed that Beckwith was almost in the midst of a French 
Brigade and heavily outnumbered. He withdrew slightly down the hill his force was 
upon and took up position amongst a tangle of low stone walls. The riflemen and light 
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infantry, dispersed behind cover were able to beat off several attacks supported by 
howitzers and two squadrons of dragoons, inflicting heavy losses on the French columns, 
especially their officers. Intermittent rain hampered both sides, soaking their paper 
cartridges. At this point the 2nd Brigade of the Light Division, under Drummond, guided 
by the sound of firing, appeared. Surprisingly, the 2nd Brigade had been ordered by 
Erskine not to engage, but Drummond ignored the order and advanced to Beckwith' s aid. 
A see-saw fight, surging up and down the hill began and swept over the French howitzers 
several times until one of them was withdrawn and the other captured and recaptured 
several times, finally falling as a prize to the British. As the battle wore on the mist 
cleared and the 3rd Division finally entered the fight. With his flank heavily engaged by 
the Light Division and his front under attack by the 3rd , Reynier decided to withdraw and 
disengaged, leaving the field to the British. Erskine with the cavalry never arrived on the 
field, he went "Lord knows where, but certainly not into the fight. ... "46 
Beckwith was without a doubt the hero of the day: 
Beckwith himself was the life and soul of the fray; he had been the 
successful leader of those who were then around him in many a bloody 
field, and his calm, clear, commanding voice was distinctly heard amid the 
roar of battle, and cheerfully obeyed. He had but single companies to 
oppose to the enemy's battalions; but, strange as it may appear, I saw him 
twice lead successful charges with but two companies of the 43rd, against 
an advancing mass of the enemy .... Beckwith's manner of command on 
those occasions was nothing more than a familiar sort of conversation with 
the soldier. To give an idea of it I may as well mention that in the last 
charge I saw him make with two companies of the 43rd, he found himself 
at once opposed to a fresh column in front, and others advancing on both 
flanks, and, seeing the necessity for immediate retreat, he called out, 
"Now, my lads, we'll just go back a little if you please." On hearing 
which every man began to run, when he shouted again, "No, no, I don't 
mean that - we are in no hurry - we'll just walk quietly back, and you can 
give them a shot as you go along." This was quite enough, and was 
obeyed to the letter - the retiring force keeping up a destructive fire, and 
46 Kincaid, Adventures in the Rifle Brigade, 68. 
regulating their movements by his, as he rode quietly back in the midst of 
them, conversing aloud in a cheerful encouraging manner - his eye all the 
while intently watching the enemy to take advantage of circumstances. A 
musket-ball had, in the meantime, shaved his forehead, and the blood was 
streaming down his countenance, which added not a little to the exciting 
interest of his appearance. As soon as we had got a little way up the face 
of our hill, he called out, "Now, my men, this will do - let us shew them 
our teeth again!" This was obeyed as steadily as if the words halt, front, 
had been given on parade, and our line was instantly in battle array, while 
Beckwith, shaking his fist in the faces of the advancing foe, called out to 
them, "Now, you rascals, come on here if you dare!"47 
To the end, however, Beckwith maintained that if one man ever decided an action 
through the command of a single company, it was Captain Hopkins of the 43rd . His 
defence of the knoll allowed Beckwith to organize sufficiently and repel the repeated 
French attacks. 48 Wellington also was quick to praise the Light Division and Colonel 
Beckwith in dispatches. 
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Massena again withdrew and, leaving a small garrison at Almeida, crossed the 
frontier into Spain. On 9 April 1811, the Light Division again took up the line of 
outposts on the line of the Agueda, south of Barba del Puerco, occupying Gallegos, 
Espeja and Fuentes de Onoro. For just over a year the Light Division had been in all but 
constant contact with the enemy, either as piquets, skirmishers, advanced or rear guards. 
They now continued on in Wellington's second invasion of Spain, once again under the 
command of Robert Craufurd, recently returned from England. 
47 Kincaid, Random Shots from a Rifleman, 168-169. 
48 Verner, History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, vol. 2, 258. 
Conclusion 
The Legacy of the 95th 
The different battalions of the 95th served with Wellington's Army throughout the 
remainder of the Peninsular War, with elements of all three battalions having served in 
the Light Division by 1813. Foil owing the peace of 1814 detachments of the regiment 
were sent to America to fight in the final stages of the War of 1812 and they also fought 
in the Waterloo Campaign of 1815. By 1815 almost all of the founders and builders of 
the 95th Rifles were dead, Moore died at Corunna, Manningham shortly after from 
exhaustion caused by the retreat, and Craufurd was killed in breach at Cuidad Rodrigo in 
1812. Due to these innovators and leaders, and of course to the sheer bravery and skill of 
the regiment's junior officers and men, the 95th had firmly established itself within the 
ranks of the British Army. 
Following the Waterloo Campaign the 95th received a very high honor from the 
Crown - it was removed from the numbered regiments of the line and re-designated the 
Rifle Brigade. In any formation in which the Rifles participated they stood at the far left 
of the formation, with no other unit beyond them, this being the second post of honor in 
any army, the premier position being the right of the line, held by the Brigade of Guards. 
Shortly afterward, the second rifle regiment, the 60th Royal Americans, received a similar 
honor, being re-designated the Kings Royal Rifle Corps. Both regiments continued to 
share a close affiliation, along with the 43rd and 52nd Light Infantry. These two regiments 
underwent a series of amalgamations and designation changes over the course of the 
nineteenth century, emerging as the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, the 
famous "Ox and Bucks." They joined the King Royal Rifle Corps and the Rifle Brigade 
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in the amalgamations of the sixties as the Royal Green Jackets, under which designation 
they serve to this day. 
The 95th proved a number of things during its development and in the campaigns 
in which it served. First: a new style of discipline was necessary and appropriate for the 
British Army. Second: the British Army, without completely altering its structure and 
general purpose, the defense of the British Isles and the colony's, could adapt its doctrine 
at the tactical level to face and indeed, defeat, a major continental army. Third: these 
tactics, with the advance of technology, were enduring, they evolved with little 
modification rather than being replaced. 
Technology is the catalyst of evolution in doctrine. The goals of warfare 
essentially have not changed since the first organized army was raised, but the manner in 
which it is waged, and the tactics employed have. As the capability of humans to 
construct ever more destructive and efficient weapons of war increases, battlefield tactics 
change with ever increasing frequency. The rifle increased the range at which soldiers 
could engage their targets. The development of the Minnie Ball allowed every soldier to 
be armed with a rifle that could be loaded as quickly as a musket, speed of loading being 
the main advantage the musket once held over the rifle. The percussion cap gave the rifle 
all weather capability. The breechloader with brass cartridges permitted even higher 
rates of fire, even from the kneeling or prone position. The bolt operated rifle, first 
manual and ultimately automatic, coupled with multiple round magazines gave the 
platoon and finally the squad, the firepower once possible only from an entire regiment. 
These developments in technology forced tactics to change in order to give the soldier the 
barest possible chance of survival. The 95th pioneered these tactics for the British Army. 
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The skirmish line; a reserve, supports, and firing line, became the standard battlefield 
formation in western armies as the century progressed. This was refined by further 
reduction in the size of tactical units and increased dispersion between units as battlefield 
lethality has increased. Squads and platoons are now employed for missions once given 
to battalions. 
The modern battlefield, due to its lethality, has forced the individual rifleman 
further and further away from his comrades and junior officers. Here the discipline 
instituted by the 95th, initiative and self-reliance, have become paramount. Officers and 
soldiers, especially platoon and squad leaders, who understand every aspect of their role 
on the battlefield and have the capability to think and act for themselves, even under fire, 
not act like parade ground martinets, are vital. The advance of this type of discipline was 
tied hand in hand with the advance of rifle technology; regimental schools, the decline 
and ultimate abolishment of flogging and the rise of the junior officer and NCO as real 
military leaders developed with the dispersion of formations on the battlefield. 
It would be foolish to claim that the 95th single handedly defeated the French in 
the Peninsular War or altered the British Army over night. Rather, they played an 
important role in shaping attitudes and perceptions of the officers who passed through 
their ranks. The importance of this investigation lies in making it clear that tactical 
developments are a piece of a greater puzzle that cannot be overlooked simply because 
they are not a piece of the big picture. Diplomacy plays its part in starting wars and 
determining the peace afterwards. Strategy charts the course of the war and places the 
opposing armies within striking distance of one another. It is tactics, the role and 
employment of small units on the battlefield, and very often the actions of perhaps one or 
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two individuals or squads, that wins battles. There may be fewer and fewer riflemen on 
the battlefields of the future, and they certainly are not as "sexy" as the big budget tanks 
and stealth fighters, but it is the rifleman with his personal weapon that still dominates the 
battlefield. The tank, for all of its sophistication, is still only there to support the infantry. 
The acceptance of the rifleman as a key element on the battlefield has been 
acknowledged by the re-emphasis on small level tactics. The United States Marine 
Corps, a world leader in infantry training and employment has started to look once again 
at the importance of the individual rifleman. Even after nearly two hundred years the 95th 
still has lessons to teach. Recently the current Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
General Charles Krulak, assigned Rifleman Dodd, a novel by C. S. Forrester, about a 
rifleman of the 95th in the Peninsular War, to the Marine Corps Reading List for squad 
leaders. Dodd and his Rifle training and discipline are held up as examples for the 
modern infantry leader. The lessons of the past must not be forgotten by the warriors of 
today. 
Appendix 1 
The Rifle Uniform 
If there was one thing which distinguished the rifleman from the remainder of the 
British Army until the advent of the khaki uniform at the end of the nineteenth century, it 
was the Rifle Green uniform and black accoutrements. The choice of a dark bottle green 
to clothe the Experimental Rifle Corps and its successors, along with the 60th, Royal 
Americans (later the King's Royal Rifle Corps), was not an arbitrary one or unique 
within the British Army for rifle armed troops. The armies of many continental nations, 
especially the Germans, had been clothing their rifle armed Jaegers in green for many 
years. 
The clothing warrant for the Experimental Rifle Corps, like all warrants for uniforms 
of British regiments, originated with a Royal Commission from the Palace at St. James's, 
on 20 May 1801. This warrant laid down the style and color of the uniform, what 
accoutrements were authorized for use and how often worn out or damaged items of 
uniform were to be replaced, displaying the rather rigid control the Crown and Army 
administration placed on military uniforms, at least for enlisted personnel: 
In a Corps of Riflemen serving in Europe, in America and at the Cape of 
Good Hope, each Sergeant, Corporal, Drummer, and Private Man shall 
have annually:-
For clothing 
A Green coat without lace. 
A Kersey waistcoat. 
A Cap, Cockade and Tuft as above specified (viz, A Cap made of Pelt and 
Leather with Brass plates, Cockade and Tuft conformable to a pattern 
approved by Us, the felt crown of the cap and Tuft to be supplied 
annually, the leather part and Brass plate and the Leather Cockade every 
two years.) 
A Pair of Green Pantaloons. 
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Belts, pouches and knapsack were to be of black leather, as were shoes and gaiters. 
Officers and NCOs carried a whistle and chain attached to a silver lions head on one of 
the cross belts with the words "Rifle Corps" engraved about it. Officers and Sergeants 
were further distinguished by a scarlet sash, that worn by NCOs having a black stripe in 
the center of it. The facings of the uniform, the collar, cuffs, and turned back tails were 
black with white "lace" tape around the top of the collar and cuffs. Officers uniforms 
were of finer material, better tailored, and embellished with black lace loops on the breast 
and back with silver buttons. Initially officers wore a "Tarleton" helmet similar to that 
worn by Light Dragoons but this was discontinued in 1803 in favor of the Shako. 
Officers also wore a highly curved saber of light cavalry design, "better calculated to 
shave a lady's maid than a Frenchman's head ... ,"1 and Hussar style boots rather than 
shoes and gaiters. 
Rank was indicated by lace stripes, epaulettes, and other devices specific to each rank 
as follows: 
Chosen Men: A single stripe on the right sleeve. 
Corporal: Two stripes on the right sleeve. 
Sergeant: Three stripes on the right sleeve. 
Color Sergeant: Single stripe with wreath, bugle horn, crossed swords and crown on the 
right sleeve. 
Drum Major, Quartermaster, Sergeant Major and Regimental Sergeant Major: Four 
stripes on the right sleeve. 
1 Kincaid, Random Shots from a Rifleman, 207. 
Ensign, Lieutenant, and Captain: Distinguished only by sash, sword, whistle, and silver 
chain epaulettes. 
Major: Epaulettes with bugle horn and star. 
Lieutenant Colonel: Epaulettes with bugle horn and crown. 
Colonel: Epaulettes with bugle horn, star and crown. 
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Appendix 2 
The Baker Rifle 
The rifle, a firearm with spiraling grooves in the barrel to impart a spin to the 
projectile and therefore increase accuracy, has almost as long a history as other firearms 
but was slow to be employed in military service on a wide scale. The product of almost 
simultaneous invention in several countries across Europe and the Middle East between 
1475 and 1525, rifles were first employed in small numbers by military forces during the 
Thirty Years War. The British Army first issued a small number of troops with rifled 
firearms in 1680 when eight rifled carbines were added to the armory of the Household 
Cavalry. 1 In 1742 Benjamin Robins in "New Principles of Gunnery" predicted the 
important role of the rifle on the battlefield, 
... Whatever State shall thoroughly comprehend the nature and advantage 
of rifled barrel pieces, and having facilitated and completed their 
construction, shall introduce into their armies their general use, with a 
dexterity in the 111anagement of them, will by this means acquire a 
superiority which will almost equal anything that has been done at any 
time by the particular excellence of any one kind of arms, and will perhaps 
fall but little short of the wonderful effect which histories relate to have 
been formerly produced by the first inventors of firearms. 2 
Prior to the creation of the Experimental Rifle Corps in 1800 several rifled weapons 
had been employed by British infantry, primarily in the Americas. For one reason or 
another they were quickly withdrawn from service. The main reasoning behind the 
failure to adopt a rifled firearm by eighteenth century armies was that they did not fit the 
tactics of the era, there was no place for the slow loading rifle amongst the required rapid 
volleys of the smooth bore musket. 
1 Quoted in Fuller, British Light Infantry, 225-226. 
2 Ibid., 227. 
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Demonstrations of the rifle's effectiveness as a skirmisher's weapon in the hands of 
skilled marksmen in the French and Indian War and the American Revolution failed to 
impress the conservative military leaders of the day. Even the invention of a breech -
loading weapon by Major Patrick Ferguson that allowed rapid fire made no impression. 
Those who believed in the future of the rifle were outside the mainstream of military 
thought until the lessons of the French Revolution brought the need of rifle armed 
skirmishers to the full attention of the military establishment of Britain in the 1790s. 
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With the creation of the Experimental Rifle Corps a board was selected to test a 
number of weapons at the military proving grounds at Woolwich. The board selected for 
the new Corps a weapon produced by Ezekiel Baker of London, a weapon which would 
become famous in the hands of the progeny of the Experimental Rifle Corps, the 95th 
Rifles (later the Rifle Brigade) and which would remain in service into the 1830s. 
The Baker Rifle as it would become universally known had the following dimensions; 
Weight: 9 ½ Pounds. 
Length: 3 ft 
Barrel Length: 30 in. 
Rifling: seven grooves with one quarter tum over the length of the barrel 
Effective Range: 300 yards. 
Sights: Fixed 100 yards. Folding Rear Sight 200 yards. 
Rate of Fire: I round per minute. 
Weight of Bullets: 20 rounds per pound oflead. 
Each rifleman was provided initially with a seventeen-inch socket bayonet. This was 
soon replaced by a flat bladed "sword" which gave the weapon an overall length of 5 feet 
10 inches and clipped to the side of the barrel rather than sliding over the muzzle. A horn 
was carried containing fine powder for loading and priming and balls were carried loose 
in a belt pouch. A brass box inlaid into the butt of the rifle held greased leather patches 
in which the balls were wrapped prior to loading in order to grip the rifling and impart a 
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spm. This made the Baker, like all rifles slow to load as there was little or no "windage" 
between the ball and the barrel, increasing effectiveness as all of the power imparted by 
the explosion of the powder in the barrel was imparted to the bullet rather than passing 
around it. Pre made cartridges wrapped in waxed paper were carried in a cartridge box if 
rapid fire was necessary but were seldom used as the coarser powder fouled the barrel 
and the unwrapped balls clogged the rifling with lead. A "picker" to clean the touch hole, 
spare flints, and brush to clean the lock were also carried.3 
3Vemer, History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, 44-45. 
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